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FISCAL GEOGRAPHY 
Eric A. San Juan* 
Abstract 
While the newly published Opportunity Atlas maps the effect of 
hometown on children’s life chances, this Article describes 
geographically sensitive tax provisions in a historical context. Under the 
recent Federal tax reform, the Opportunity Zone shadows predecessors 
like the Recovery Zone, GO Zone, Liberty Zone, and Empowerment 
Zone. While relief from unemployment and poverty attracts legislators’ 
sympathy, underlying these provisions is the ideology of the enterprise 
zone, or the paradox of the governmentally created free market. This 
Article analyzes that ideal concept by tracing the history of taxation in 
barter as well as market economies. Wherever governments have 
collected tax on a national scale, the fiscal result has been geographic and 
ultimately economic redistribution. Then the question is whether that 
redistribution advances horizontal or vertical equity. The legal 
enforceability of socio-economic rights has become the philosophical 
afterthought. Classically, the rule of law was posed as freedom from 
government intervention, but the enterprise zone exemplifies freedom as 
a legislative artifact. In this context, the incentive effect of the tax zone 
legislation depends on the economic behavior of the taxpayer. The 
empirical studies on enterprise zones document modest take-up by the 
intended taxpayers, whose choices may reflect cultural psychology as 
much as calculated rationality. There may be neither free market nor 
rational actor in the enterprise zone. As a creation of tax law, the zone is 
monitored by the tax collector, who falls into the odd role of facilitator 
for the incentive provision. Governed by her own behavioral praxis, the 
revenue agent becomes a functionary on a larger economic stage. In 
particular, the desuetude of the American inner city and Rust Belt reflect 
the fiscal geography of Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions past and 
present. It may take an intervention more heroic than focused tax 
incentives to revive a “blighted” market.  
  
 
 * Adj. Prof. Georgetown Univ. L. Ctr. Past Chair, Tax Pol’y Comm. Amer. Bar Assoc. 
Founding member, Core Idea Group (exec. comm.) of Meridian-180.org, the multi-lingual 
platform of the global policy consortium initiated by the Clarke Program on E. Asian L. & Culture, 
Cornell Univ. A.B. 1987 Harv. J.D. 1991 ibid. M.A. 1996 Univ. of Chicago. The views expressed 
in this Article are those of the author alone. 
378 UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 31 
 
 I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 378 
  A. Economic Geography ..................................................... 378 
  B. Overview ......................................................................... 380 
 
 II. HISTORICAL & PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND ...................... 382 
  A. The Local Source of Revenue ......................................... 383 
  B. Hypothetical Geography ................................................ 386 
  C. Social Contract ............................................................... 388 
  D. Rule of Law & Distributive Justice ................................ 389 
  E. Social Entitlements ......................................................... 390 
  F. Summary ......................................................................... 394 
 
 III. LAND OF OPPORTUNITY .......................................................... 394 
  A. Enterprise Zone .............................................................. 396 
  B. Federal Legislation ........................................................ 399 
  C. Zone of Empowerment .................................................... 400 
  D. Zones of Crisis ................................................................ 405 
  E. Zone of Recovery ............................................................ 410 
  F. Land of OZ ...................................................................... 411 
  G. Summary ......................................................................... 413 
 
 IV. TRAVELERS IN THE LAND OF OZ ............................................ 413 
  A. The Psychological Taxpayer .......................................... 414 
  B. The Practical Bureaucrat ............................................... 416 
  C. The Para-Ethnographer ................................................. 418 
  D. Summary ......................................................................... 421 
 
 V. GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION ................................................... 422 
 
 VI. CONCLUSION .......................................................................... 425 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  Economic Geography 
Recent research confirms the determinative effect of geography on 
residents’ life chances. Collaborating with the United States Census, the 
Opportunity Atlas traces the roots of outcomes such as poverty and 
incarceration “back to the neighborhoods in which children grew up.”1 
Following a five-year birth cohort, demographers can pinpoint where the 
thirty-five- to forty-year-old adults now live, whether in prison or at 
 
 1. Raj Chetty et al., The Opportunity Atlas: Mapping the Childhood Roots of Social 
Mobility 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25147, 2018), https://www.nber 
.org/papers/w25147.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9FM-MNNU]. 
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large.2 It turns out that birthplace or hometown predicts adult success. 
Neighborhoods matter. 
The Opportunity Atlas sheds new light on an old concern. An earlier 
notion in social science had posited that poverty “tends to perpetuate 
itself.”3 Then, the “setting [was] a cash economy, with wage labor and 
production for profit and with a persistently high rate of unemployment 
and underemployment, at low wages, for unskilled labor.”4 There, “the 
culture of poverty” was “both an adaptation and a reaction of the poor to 
their marginal position in a class-stratified, highly individuated, 
capitalistic society.”5 Where poverty was a stagnant milieu, one solution 
could be to leave. 
If America was a land of opportunity, part of the attraction was the 
places to go. In the Unites States, a seminal thesis of cultural geography 
has been that “the traditional spatial and social allocation of individuals 
through the lottery of birth is being replaced gradually by a process of 
relative self-selection of lifestyle, goals, social niche, and place of 
residence.”6 Here, the advance of “voluntary regions” confirmed the 
economic influence of geography.7 
There is more to a place than the effect of individual residence 
introduced above. “Geography matters because it affects the profitability 
of various kinds of economic activities, including agriculture, mining, 
and industry” and “the health of the population.”8 Writ large, the concern 
extends from birthplace or hometown to the movement of populations 
and production. Ultimately, productive populations form the tax base.  
Now comes the Opportunity Zone (OZ). In this context, it should be 
no surprise that OZ is attracting attention as a provision of the Federal tax 
reform under implementation in the Tax Cuts & Jobs Act of 2017 
(TC&JA ’17).9 Like its precursors, the OZ legislation offers income tax 
reduction to businesses in impoverished zones.10 On one hand, the 
alleviation of poverty garners popular sympathy. On the other hand, the 
 
 2. Id. “For example, 44% of black men who grew up in the lowest-income families in 
Watts, a neighborhood in central Los Angeles, are incarcerated on a single day (April 1, 2010 – 
the day of the 2010 Census). By contrast, 6.2% of black men who grew up in families with similar    
incomes in central Compton, 2.3 miles south of Watts, are incarcerated on a single day.” Id. at 3. 
 3. Oscar Lewis, The Culture of Poverty, 215 SCI. AM. 19, 21 (1966). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. WILBUR ZELINSKY, THE CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE UNITED STATES 111 (rev. ed. 
1993). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Jeffrey D. Sachs, Government, Geography, and Growth: The True Drivers of Economic 
Development, 91 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 142, 148 (2012). 
 9. STAFF OF J. COMM. TAX’N, 115TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF PUBLIC LAW 115-
97 131, 316–17 (Jt. Comm. Print 2018). 
 10. Id. 
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incentive for entrepreneurs may satisfy those motivated by self-interest. 
The appeal across the aisle has made various forms of enterprise zone a 
legislative inevitability over the years. Yet the provisions’ economic 
effectiveness remains an open question.11  
Already, news reports question who should land in OZ. The online 
retail behemoth Amazon.com planned to relocate a headquarter office to 
“Long Island City, the fast-gentrifying Queens neighborhood across the 
East River from the skyscrapers of midtown Manhattan.”12 There, the 
company was to enjoy the “Trump Tax Break” although the “[m]edian 
income around Amazon’s planned campus is $130,000, poverty is half 
the city average and new buildings were going up long before the tax 
overhaul.”13 If the intent was to lift residents out of poverty, the reported 
gentrifying effect would be inefficient.14 Nevertheless, the provision 
follows a long history of geographically based taxation.  
B.  Overview 
This Article will discuss the tax incentive zones in the context of 
revenue legislation as developed in various locations through history. 
While no particular provision of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) need 
be reduced to any ancient antecedent, general principles may emerge 
regarding the national collection of revenue wherever producers may 
have been located. Whatever natural economies may have obtained, 
increasing complexity was eventually governed by the rule of law. That 
is, taxation always has been a diagnostic aspect of government inasmuch 
as the revenue law indicates the extent of horizontal and vertical equity 
in a national territory. In the end, fiscal geography may help describe the 
extent to which an advanced economy is distributive.  
This Article is organized as follows: Section II begins with the local 
source of revenue.15 For reasons drawn from philosophy and social 
science, historical examples of taxes illustrate this Article. At least 
 
 11. See Scott Eastman & Nicole Kaeding, Opportunity Zones: What We Know and What 
We Don’t, TAX FOUND. 8 n.26 (Jan. 2019) (warning of the possibility that the incentivized 
“investments generate employment opportunities that do not match the skills of existing 
residents”).  
 12. Associated Press, Amazon’s NYC Home in “Opportunity Zone” for Trump Tax Break, 
WTOP NEWS (Nov. 14, 2018, 1:18 AM), https://wtop.com/real-estate/2018/11/amazons-nyc-
home-in-opportunity-zone-for-trump-tax-break/ [https://perma.cc/5CH2-4FD3]. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Dan Weil, The Trump Administration Said These Tax Breaks Would Help Distressed 
Neighborhoods. Who’s Actually Benefiting?, WASH. POST (June 6, 2019, 6:30 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/opportunity-zones-are-loaded-with-tax-benefits-but-
will-they-actually-help-residents/2019/06/05/0f80e1c6-7e68-11e9-8bb7-0fc796cf2ec0_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/9WYG-YUBL] (Although Amazon’s N.Y.C. plan dissolved, “experts” 
continued to “worry that some of the investment may not benefit the intended targets.”). 
 15. See infra Section II. 
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theoretically, if not archaeologically, pristine elements of taxation may 
be isolated.  
Then Section II continues with the question of what the government 
must do to maintain the contributory capacity of the taxpayer 
population.16 Whether glossed as taxation with representation, consent of 
the governed, or otherwise, the fiscal state must contend with the rule of 
law and distributive justice. This historical and philosophical context sets 
the stage for OZ in Section III.17 
If geographic and economic redistribution has always been a fiscal 
function, then tax zone legislation may be the latest iteration. The various 
statutes have combined the entrepreneurial spirit of the free market with 
the impulse to relieve poverty in a legislatively ingenious, if internally 
inconsistent, package. Empirically, the results have been modest at best, 
with respect to either increase in commerce or decrease in unemployment 
and poverty levels.18 The lasting effect may lie in law-makers’ 
predilection for demarcating zones.  
Section IV delves into the perspective of the individuals involved.19 
The modest take-up rate is a question of behavioral economics for the 
entrepreneurial taxpayer. The tax incentive may not outweigh the 
perceived cost of opening a business in the inner city or blighted 
countryside. Given the business choice, the tax agency may serve as a 
mirror. Under the incentive provision, the tax collector appears as a 
collaborator rather than an adversary. This view allows Section IV to 
characterize the tax official more fully. Just as the taxpayer is not merely 
a rational actor, the tax collector is no fiscal automaton. Section IV adopts 
the anthropological innovation of para-ethnography to capture the self-
awareness of the collaborator.20 Where behavioral economics describes 
taxpayer psychology, para-ethnography describes the bureaucratic praxis 
of the tax authority. The coordinated actions of these individuals 
operationalize the tax provisions. 
Section V discusses the tax zone legislation in the context of world 
historical industrial transformation.21 Incentives operate in an economic 
context, inasmuch as the federal income tax never drove commerce away 
from the zones in the first place. So-called urban blight and the Rust Belt 
were casualties of global industrialization. Consequently, it should be no 
surprise that tax incentives have not lured business back. 
 
 16. See infra Section II. 
 17. See infra Section III. 
 18. Opportunity Zones: Facts and Figures, ECON. INNOVATION GRP., https://eig.org/ 
opportunityzones/facts-and-figures/ [https://perma.cc/VU2X-DAZ2] (Jan. 2020). 
 19. See infra Section IV. 
 20. See infra Section IV. 
 21. See infra Section V. 
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Section VI concludes as follows: Whatever the flaws of the particular 
tax zone legislation, the provisions confirm the legislator’s intuition that 
tax is geographically and economically redistributive.22 In this function, 
the taxpayer and tax collector may behave as a complementary couple 
rather than an adversarial pair. In the midst of today’s trans-Pacific 
industrial revolution, the question is how much the fiscal apparatus can 
stabilize the people’s life chances.23 This harks back to fundamental 
questions of distributive justice attendant to the advent of “civilized 
society.”24 
II.  HISTORICAL & PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND 
To analyze taxation in its component parts, this Article begins with 
the local source of revenue. Both historically and theoretically, tax law 
applies to the productive taxpayer who has natural connections to home 
and culture. In this regard, scholars have observed that “law and 
ethnography are crafts of place: they work by the light of local 
knowledge . . . . [A]nthropology and jurisprudence . . . are alike absorbed 
with the artisan task of seeing broad principles in parochial facts.”25 This 
Section weaves together the relevant principles of law and social 
science.26 Incorporating the essentially parochial taxpayer into a national 
economy has long been the problem of the social contract.27 Even where 
the rule of law prevails, the maintenance of the taxpayer population raises 
the issue of distributive justice. Among the historical responses to this 
issue has been the extension of human rights from civil liberties to social 
entitlements, to wit, the welfare state.28 While these governmental 
responses have appeared in advanced economies, they had antecedents in 
ancient civilizations.29 The apparatus of fiscal geography has been long 
 
 22. See infra Section VI. 
 23. Jan Breman, Int’l Inst. Soc. Stud. Erasmus Univ. Rotterdam, The Great Transformation 
in the Setting of Asia, Address at the 57th Anniversary of the International Institute of Social 
Studies 3 (Oct. 29, 2009), https://www.wiego.org/sites/default/files/publications/files/Breman_ 
Transformation.Asia_pdf [https://perma.cc/3H9P-KPQA]. 
 24. Compañía Gen. de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 
100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
 25. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Local Knowledge: Fact & Law in Comparative Perspective, in 
LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETATIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 167 (1st ed. 1983). 
 26. See generally Daniel Blocq & Maartje van der Woude, Making Sense of the Law & 
Society Movement, 11 ERASMUS L. REV. 134 (2018) (“focus[ing] on the evolution of the Law and 
Society Movement (L&S) – an important alternative site for the empirical study of law and legal 
institutions”). 
 27. See SALLY FALK MOORE, POWER AND PROPERTY IN INCA PERU 1 (1st ed. 1958) (“How 
was it possible for five million or more relatively primitive people to be organized under one 
ruler? How were they taxed, how were they governed? These are questions which have been asked 
since the 16th century and have, more often than not, been answered with extreme naíveté.”). 
 28. See discussion infra Section II.E. 
 29. E.g., id.  
2021] FISCAL GEOGRAPHY 383 
 
in the making. The mechanism of national taxation with concomitant 
redistribution lays the philosophical foundation for the latter-day zone 
legislation.  
A.  The Local Source of Revenue 
Throughout world history, civilizations arose where revenue flowed.30 
Specifically, this meant the “geographical and social concentration of a 
surplus product.”31 Where resources and agriculture were profitable, they 
could generate revenue that became the “life-blood of government.”32 In 
sum, government connects far-flung localities.  
For example, anthropologists have studied taxation particularly in the 
sixteenth century Inca Empire in South America. This empire 
encompassed as many as five million people within a couple million 
square kilometers.33 There, the source of wealth was epitomized by gold 
and silver mines in the first instance, subject to “a local, rather than a 
national control and exploitation.”34 Nevertheless, “[e]ach region 
contributed what it specialized in geographically or professionally,” 
whether in crops or skilled handicraft.35 Then those contributions “went 
in part to Cuzco [the imperial capital]; in part to support the provincial 
capital; in part to care for traveling armies and officials as they passed 
through; in part to maintain newly settled mitimaes [the imperially 
conscripted laborers], probably to support the local population when road 
work was undertaken, and to maintain some of the poor and people too 
old to do agricultural labor.”36 To recapitulate, minerals and arable land 
gave rise to civilization extending beyond the local village, connected by 
ties, including taxation. 
The Inca case is not unique in this respect. It was preceded by other 
primary examples, such as the South Asian civilization. Arising in the 
fourth century BCE, the Mauryan dynasty ruled as many as fifty million 
people in five million square kilometers (which then engulfed the original 
city of Mohenjo Daro).37 According to Indian historians, “mines . . . were 
owned by the state, and were . . . let out to entrepreneurs, from whom the 
 
 30. See CHARLES ADAMS, FOR GOOD & EVIL: THE IMPACT OF TAXES ON THE COURSE OF 
CIVILIZATION xxi (2d ed. 1993).  
 31. David Harvey, The Right to the City, NEW LEFT REV. (2008), https://newleftreview 
.org/issues/II53/articles/david-harvey-the-right-to-the-city [https://perma.cc/S7HK-9WXX]. 
 32. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935). 
 33. See MOORE, supra note 27; Peter Turchin et al., East-West Orientation of Historical 
Empires and Modern States, 12 J. WORLD-SYS. RSCH. 219, 222 tbl.1 (2006). 
 34. MOORE, supra note 27, at 40. 
 35. Id. at 124. 
 36. Id. at 34, 110–11. 
 37. Roger Boesche, Kautilya’s Arthaśastra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India, 67 J. 
MIL. HIST. 9, 12 (2003); Turchin et al., supra note 33, at 222.  
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king claimed a percentage of their output as a royalty.”38 In this case, the 
mineral resource was locally worked yet accrued to the benefit of the 
larger kingdom.  
The inception of civilization governing an expanse that was national 
rather than local set forth fundamental issues of law and social science. 
Production occurred through naturally local agriculture. National 
collection and redistribution of revenue posed the problem of uniformity. 
In the Inca example, the quipu, a counting device composed of knotted 
cords (perhaps an American version of the abacus), has been featured in 
the social science literature as an artifact of accounting.39 “[W]ell suited 
to recording the kind of numerical information necessary for an extensive 
tax and conscription program,” the quipu rendered a “universal method 
throughout the empire . . . entirely feasible.”40 The quipu iconizes 
national accountability over a population which is still tied to the land. 
The Inca example shows how empires grow from villages. When their 
army “conquered people already grouped in some political unit, the Inca 
did not hesitate to employ the administrative machinery they found 
already functioning.”41 Then, “the folk community was forcefully linked 
both to a provincial capital and to Cuzco through the imposition of taxes, 
the Sun cult [the national religion], the Quechua language and the court 
and high government.”42 In anthropological terms, the connection 
between the local community and the national institutions was codified 
by culture. In sum, the “Inca political achievement is precisely in the 
extension of local government methods to an empire.”43 The significance 
of the Inca example lies in the pristine connection between the local and 
the national.  
Government on a national scale was inherently redistributive in scope. 
For the local official, “tenure may have depended on his ability to extract 
taxes.”44 Tribute came in the form of crops harvested from farms 
“subdivided into small plots whose produce was allocated for many local 
purposes and local deities, only a part going to provincial capitals and to 
Cuzco, to support the official national religion of the realm.”45 Thus, a 
local collector could have had the ability to divert revenue from imperial 
to local purposes. In particular, anthropologists have documented that 
“there were people who, by reason of not being in the family of an able-
 
 38. A.L. BASHAM, THE WONDER THAT WAS INDIA: A SURVEY OF THE CULTURE OF THE 
INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT BEFORE THE COMING OF THE MUSLIMS 101 (1954). 
 39. See JACOB BRONOWSKI, THE ASCENT OF MAN 101 (1973); CAROLYN WEBBER & AARON 
WILDAVSKY, A HISTORY OF TAXATION AND EXPENDITURE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 39 (1986). 
 40. MOORE, supra note 27, at 102. 
 41. Id. at 122. 
 42. Id. at 26, 130. 
 43. Id. at 111. 
 44. Id. at 33. 
 45. Id. at 26. 
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bodied man, or being able to work themselves, were supported by the 
community.”46 Accordingly, redistribution was both geographic and 
economic. 
Again, the Inca example resonates with the evolution of civilizations 
around the world. “After the Mauryan period,” for example, “it became 
usual for kings to pay their officers and favourites not with cash, but with 
the right to collect revenue from a village or group of villages.”47 Tax 
collection “often carried other privileges, and usually made the recipient 
the intermediary between king and taxpayer.”48 Taxation implied 
delegation. 
The redistributive aspect came with the territory of an imperial 
sovereign. Logistically, “the wider his empire the more power he must 
delegate to others.”49 In particular, “[t]ax law tells much about the nature 
of government, the price it exacted and the price it had to pay for self-
maintenance.”50 To maintain the loyalty of the population, the 
government distributed and extracted. 
Excessive extraction would have been self-defeating. Instead, the 
Sanskrit text metaphorically cautioned that “the king should tax as a bee 
sucks honey, without hurting the flower.”51 The taxpayer and tax 
collector were symbiotic. 
In effect, supralocal taxation spreads the wealth of local taxpayers. 
Among the fifty states of the United States today, per capita federal 
liability is progressive.52 In the richest state of Connecticut, the per capita 
federal tax is $10,364, and in the poorest state, Mississippi, $2,883.53 In 
American history, “the federal income tax has played a key role in 
enabling the federal government to redistribute the nation’s resources in 
a southward direction.”54 From each, the tax takes according to the ability 
to pay. 
The redistributive effect was no accident. From the inception of the 
Federal income tax, “Southern politicians supported the Sixteenth 
 
 46. MOORE, supra note 27, at 25–26. 
 47. BASHAM, supra note 38, at 96. 
 48. Id. 
 49. MOORE, supra note 27, at 106. 
 50. Id. at 2. 
 51. BASHAM, supra note 38, at 109; KUNWAR DEO PRASAD, TAXATION IN ANCIENT INDIA: 
FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES UP TO THE GUPTAS 27 (1987). From 200 BCE, the Panchatantra taught, 
“The king who tastes his kingdom like/Elixir, bit by bit/Who does not overtax its life,/Will fully 
relish it,” VISHNU SHARMA, PANCHATANTRA 3–4, 83 (Arthur W. Ryder trans., Univ. Chi. Press 
1925). 
 52. See Richard Barrington, Which States Pay the Most Federal Taxes?, MONEYRATES 
(Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.money-rates.com/research-center/federal-income-taxes-by-state.htm 
[https://perma.cc/QW6T-Y6V5]. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Robin L. Einhorn, Look Away Dixieland: The South and the Federal Income Tax, 108 
NW. U. L. REV. 773, 780 (2014). 
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Amendment because they believed that the South would benefit.”55 By 
the time of the New Deal, Progressives advocated for redistribution from 
the “Northeast” which they “understood essentially as a synonym for 
industrial and financial capital.”56 After World War II, the income tax 
enabled “the federal budget to operate as a mighty engine of geographical 
redistribution.”57 The combination of these fiscal facts and the anti-tax 
rhetoric mentioned below form an irony in American history.  
Across the ideological spectrum, commentators have drawn their own 
inferences. Since the Inca empire, national taxation along with 
nationalized (royal) ownership of property (realty) have attracted labels 
as both L’Empire socialiste des Inka and el estado feudal incaico.58 Even 
today, advocates for nationalized land reform in privatized agrarian 
economies ironically echo the “overt coercive apparatus” of pre-modern 
“serfdom.”59 Redistribution may be alternatively socializing or 
totalizing.60  
B.  Hypothetical Geography 
In some respects, each civilization may be unique. At the same time, 
scholars have long presupposed a primordial state from which political 
evolution proceeded.61 “Thus in the beginning all the World was 
America—even more so than America is now, because in the beginning 
no such thing as money was known anywhere.”62 In these terms, the 
eighteenth-century European Enlightenment looked to the New World 
for a clean slate upon which to inscribe first principles.63 In South 
America, before the Spanish arrival, it was true that the Quechua-
speaking people conducted a barter economy.64 From historical instances, 
philosophers hypothesized an ideal state.65 
 
 55. Id. at 796.  
 56. Id. at 784. 
 57. Id. at 780. 
 58. MOORE, supra note 27, at 5. See generally LOUIS BAUDIN, A SOCIALIST EMPIRE: THE 
INCAS OF PERU (Arthur Goddard ed., Katherine Woods trans., 1961). 
 59. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, PLASTICITY INTO POWER: COMPARATIVE-
HISTORICAL STUDIES ON THE INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SUCCESS 
126 (1987). 
 60. See ERICH FROMM, THE FEAR OF FREEDOM 35 (1942) (“One was born into a certain 
economic position which guaranteed a livelihood determined by tradition, just as it carried 
economic obligations to those higher in the social hierarchy.”). 
 61. See, e.g., HARRY ECKSTEIN, REGARDING POLITICS: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THEORY, 
STABILITY, AND CHANGE 81 (1992). 
 62. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. V § 49 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 
Hackett Publ’g Co. 1980) (1689).  
 63. John A. Powell & Stephen M. Menendian, Remaking Law: Moving Beyond 
Enlightenment Jurisprudence, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1035, 1055 (2010). 
 64. See MOORE, supra note 27, at 86.  
 65. Powell & Menendian, supra note 63, at 1037. 
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Subsequently, anthropologists coined “pristine state” as a term of 
material culture.66 When the ancient valleys of the Yellow, Nile, Indus, 
Euphrates, and Tigris Rivers were yet untouched by other civilizations, 
states “emerged from stratified societies and experienced the slow, 
autochthonous growth of the specialized formal instruments of social 
control out of their own needs for these institutions.”67 Additionally, 
anthropologists introduced Mesoamerica, Andean South America, and 
Polynesia as pristine states.68 As evidence and analysis advanced, the 
concept of the pristine state became less pure.69 Nevertheless, 
anthropologists still find comparison useful among archaeological sites 
of indigenous development, especially in Yoruba and Benin as well as 
those already mentioned above, including China, Egypt, India, 
Mesopotamia, Zapotec, and Inca.70 Specifically in the Yellow River 
Valley, the original city was engulfed by the Xia dynasty arising in 1800 
BCE over 450 thousand square kilometers71 encompassing 13.5 million 
people by the second century BCE.72 Although archaeology is different 
from the philosophical ideal, this Article refers to examples from 
civilizations around the world. 
The comparability of civilizations throughout the world depends on 
the circumstances. As noted above, geography comes to life through the 
course of the historical movements of productive populations. In turn, 
boundaries move. “A hundred years ago, the frontier between West and 
East was located somewhere in the neighborhood of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Now it seems to run through every European city.”73 In 
other words, people experience geography through culture.  
Ancient, as well as modern, history reflects the cultural geography of 
world civilizations. For instance, classical Greece, located in what is now 
the European Union, had its significant “intellectual links” with the 
“ancient Egyptians, Iranians and Indians” rather than the 
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contemporaneous Westerners.74 Historical affinities reflect a changed 
economic order. 
To be clear, the Inca empire was no egalitarian Eden. Rather, it was a 
“conquest state,” comprised of pre-existing tribes colonized by military 
force.75 Similarly, other pristine states also arose from war. From the sixth 
century BCE, the Taittiriya Upanisad characterized the organic origin of 
a kingdom in these terms, “[for] they who have no king cannot fight.”76 
Here, history may falsify eighteenth century philosophy and conjecture. 
Nowadays, political philosophers disclaim the state of nature. That 
was not “an actual historical state of affairs, much less . . . a primitive 
condition of culture.”77 Instead, the “original position” of equality is an 
imagined pre-political status from which the provisions of the social 
contract derive by hypothesis.78 The significance of the status lies in the 
rationale for leaving it. 
C.  Social Contract 
In a civilization or political society characterized in part by taxation, 
revenue becomes a burden on the taxpayers. Assuming the original state 
of objective equality, the question of tax fairness arises. Then “it is hard 
to imagine . . . a successful income tax scheme on a voluntary basis,” 
because the “suspicion that others are not honoring their duties and 
obligations is increased by the fact that, in the absence of the authoritative 
interpretation and enforcement of the rules, it is particularly easy to find 
excuses for breaking them.”79 Consequently, uniform implementation 
becomes imperative. 
The moral implication was apparent at the outset. For example, the 
sixth century BCE Buddhist monarch Mahasammata stated that the king 
is entitled to tax his people only  
if he protects them, and that he obtains in addition a share of 
the religious merit acquired by them, especially by his 
brahman subjects; if he fails in his duty he has no moral right 
to receive tax, and reaps a share of all the demerit accruing 
to his subjects.80 
The tax collector had to remain on high moral ground for the taxpayer to 
follow suit. 
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A more calculated rationale for taxation is possible. A utilitarian 
“thinks that income taxes are just only if they . . . contribute to the 
greatest long-term happiness, and it does not matter to him whether or not 
they take the property without the owner’s consent.”81 Some civilizations 
may have been built in part on this premise. 
On the other hand, that kind of calculus raises the question of vertical 
equity. “An economy can be optimal in this sense even when some people 
are rolling in luxury and others are near starvation as long as the starvers 
cannot be made better off without cutting into the pleasures of the rich.”82 
In short, the persistence of taxes and the government it feeds depends on 
either coercion or consent.  
D.  Rule of Law & Distributive Justice 
Assuming that consent is the desirable basis, taxation should come 
under the rule of law. There is a range of literature on liberal legality, yet 
the distinctive characteristic may be nomothetic order where even the 
sovereign holding political power “feels bound by the law.”83 
Accordingly, the New England counterparts to the eighteenth century 
Enlightenment established a “government of laws and not of men.”84 
When the British “Parliament proclaimed its sovereignty over the 
colonies by retaining a tax on tea of threepence a pound,” the Bostonians 
complained that taxation without representation is tyranny.85 Currently, 
these historic slogans may be appropriated for anachronistic purposes, yet 
the propositions stand. Pre-existing legislation can preclude dictatorship.  
Nevertheless, the rule of law would not guarantee fairness. Nineteenth 
century writers warned of the so-called “tyranny of the majority.”86 
Twentieth-century contractarians conceded that “[t]here seems to be no 
way to characterize a feasible procedure guaranteed to lead to just 
legislation.”87 Similarly, “when an axiomatic structure, with reasonable-
looking axioms, yields the existence of a dictator as an implication of 
jointly chosen—individually plausible—axioms, this is readily 
understood as a major embarrassment for that set of propositions.”88 
Instead, the question of substantive justice arises.  
 
 81. DWORKIN, supra note 78, at 73. 
 82. SEN, supra note 74, at 68–69. 
 83. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL ORDER: FROM PREHUMAN TIMES TO THE 
FRENCH REVOLUTION 246 (2011). 
 84. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXX (1780). 
 85. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, 3 HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES: THE AGE OF 
REVOLUTION 145 (1957). 
 86. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA pt. 2, ch. 7 (Harvey C. 
Mansfield & Delba Winthrop, eds. & trans., Univ. Chi. Press 2002) (1840). 
 87. RAWLS, supra note 77, at 360. 
 88. SEN, supra note 74, at 269. 
390 UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 31 
 
Where procedure falls short, substantive justice may begin. First 
comes “the intuitively appealing principle of fairness that if one person 
slices the cake and the other gets first pick the division of the cake will 
be fair even if it is unequal.”89 Then comes the more subjective problem 
of “how to consolidate individual intentions into a collective, group 
intention.”90 Here, the hermeneutics of jurisprudence may be 
unavoidable. It would be impossible to “ignore the questions about the 
internal character of legal argument . . . like innumerate histories of 
mathematics.”91 The rule of law must be internally consistent.  
E.  Social Entitlements 
Extending the rule of law, subsistence, human, or social rights have 
deep and widespread conceptual roots if not a pedigreed intellectual 
genealogy. In fifth century BCE China, the Analects suggested that 
“[r]iches and honors acquired by unrighteousness” were unjust.92 Wealth 
(or lack thereof) has long been associated with justice (or lack thereof).93 
Nowadays, economists describe this as vertical equity.94  
Ancient civilizations developed social theories. In the third century 
BCE, the Arthaśastra suggested that during “famine, the king shall show 
favour to his people by . . . distributing either his own collection of 
provisions or the hoarded income of the rich.”95 For the state to persist, 
the population had to be maintained.  
Similarly, legal penalties have long recognized wealth, poverty, or 
socio-economic status. In the first century BCE, the Laws of Manu 
prescribed penalties for theft proportionate to the caste of the thief, lowest 
for the poorest. Thus, the “guilt of a Sudra shall be eightfold, that of a 
Vaisya sixteenfold, that of a Kshatriya two-and-thirtyfold . . . That of a 
Brahmana sixty-fourfold.”96 The punishment fit not only the crime but 
the social station of the criminal.  
At the dawn of the Christian Era, the underprivileged again rose to the 
fore. The Bible emphasized “the least of these my brethren.”97 In the late 
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twentieth century, an encyclical would revisit the proposition that “men 
are obliged to come to the relief of the poor and to do so not merely out 
of their superfluous goods. If one is in extreme necessity, he has the right 
to procure for himself what he needs out of the riches of others.”98 Relief 
from poverty was cast as a right. 
Before the theory of consent by the governed, the support of the 
population may have appeared as a practical consideration. Returning to 
the Inca example, the pristine fiscal order was inclusive in an imperial 
style.99 In particular, some “taxes harvested for the Inca were not even 
taken to the provincial capital, but remained in local storehouses.”100 
From there, the poor, “namely those members of the community too old 
or ill to do agricultural labor,” were “supported in part by the Inca 
storehouses, as was the whole local population in a year of famine.”101 
Additionally, these “local stores were also used to maintain the 
agriculturalists when they served in local segments of provincial or 
national projects such as the building and repairing of storehouses, roads, 
and irrigation works near their own communities.”102 As previously 
observed, taxation was both economically and geographically 
redistributive.103  
In the Inca Empire, acts pursuant to subsistence were sanctioned.104 
According to reported cases, the theft of food from a royal farm resulted 
in the death penalty; likewise, theft out of vice was punishable by 
torture.105 By contrast, theft because of poverty resulted in “slight 
punishment” or pardon, while theft out of necessity when traveling on the 
road was forgiven.106 While these legal cases are older, they were 
precursors of what was to come. 
Originally, the rule of law was associated with the Enlightenment.107 
Then, the individual asserted rights as against the state.108 At the time of 
the Industrial Revolution, the concept of the rule of law comported with 
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participation in the free market.109 At that point, the significant legal 
rights were those applicable to civil society, or civil liberties, as 
constitutionalized (for instance, the 1789 Bill of Rights).110 Civil rights 
had yet to face expansion.111 
After World War II, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
stated:  
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for 
the health and well-being of himself and of his family, 
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and 
necessary social services, and the right to security in the 
event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, 
old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond 
his control.112 
Consequently, social entitlements became rights.113 The question is, then, 
whether these rights are enforceable.  
If the people in the original state could legislate a fair tax code, 
hypothetically they would apply certain principles. Specifically, taxation 
“can be justified only as promoting directly or indirectly the social 
conditions that secure the equal liberties and as advancing in an 
appropriate way the long-term interests of the least advantaged.”114 This 
presumes objective (blind) equality.   
Hypothetically, the fair tax code would develop detailed provisions. 
For example, the fiscal regime could guarantee “a social minimum either 
by family allowances and special payments for sickness and employment, 
or more systematically by such devices as a graded income supplement 
(a so-called negative income tax).”115 Soon after Professor Rawls made 
this observation, the U.S. Congress enacted the earned income tax credit 
(EITC), a refundable wage supplement for low-income workers and their 
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children.116 Thus, future tax equity could have both historical and 
philosophical foundations. 
The rationale for social entitlements is that without them, civil rights 
are hollow. The social entitlements include “the provision of living 
conditions that are socially, technologically, and ecologically 
safeguarded, insofar as the current circumstances make this necessary if 
citizens are to have equal opportunities to utilize the civil rights.”117 As a 
practical matter, the impecunious cannot enjoy rights like those to private 
property. 
For example, consider a contemporary case of implementation. In 
Southeast Asia, Judge Pangalangan writes that international human rights 
like those to health may be “advanced through domestic legislation,” yet 
“have rarely given rise to justiciable rights.”118 In “a fragile democracy 
like the Philippines, where State institutions are weak,” health “was 
hitherto a family matter, and its burdens absorbed by the private sphere. 
The international indicia assume that the costs are borne through social 
security and health insurance, and properly shift them to the public 
sphere.”119 To the extent that human rights encompass social 
entitlements, they imply a need for development of the welfare state. 
Thus, social justice obtains where the “poor and disadvantaged” 
people have recourse to the rule of law.120 Conversely, the rule of law 
would not accede to reading into “welfare and taxation schemes 
provisions equality of resources would approve,” unless codified in the 
legislation.121 Uniform implementation is still necessary. 
The various historical sanctions may not form a direct lineage. 
Nevertheless, precursors to social rights were widespread throughout 
world civilizations. The social entitlements create “the much further-
reaching obligation for the state to use its power for the benefit of its 
citizens, giving them a right to food, shelter, education,” and so forth.122 
“Whether such needs should be formulated in the form of rights is a 
question often debated, but practically speaking more or less settled in 
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favour with the adoption of these rights into international rights treaties 
and many constitutions worldwide.”123 A century ago, the “richer 
countries devoted one percent of their wealth to supporting children, the 
poor, and the aged; today they spend almost a quarter of it.”124 
Philosophically, these social rights may be grounded on the concept of 
blind justice that favors the least advantaged.  
F.  Summary 
History established redistribution as a fundamental fiscal function. 
From the parochial location of the taxpayer, redistribution was inevitable 
when states imposed national tax law. Philosophically, the original 
position of blind equality may have served to naturalize the social 
contract. Rather than interventions in the hypothetically free market, the 
organic precursors to socio-economic entitlements may have been the 
redistributive mechanisms to maintain the productive taxpayer 
population. Ancient civilizations exemplified geographic as well as 
economic redistribution. In national taxation, the Inca made efforts “to 
keep the burden from falling more heavily on one community than 
another, and demands which could be distributed equally or borne in turn 
were dealt with this way.”125 Meanwhile, “[l]ocal building and road 
projects were financed locally, though done in the name of the Inca and 
Sun” national religion.126 Thus, geographically sensitive taxation had 
prehistoric antecedents. 
III.  LAND OF OPPORTUNITY 
In North Atlantic history, the usage of geography followed the needs 
of the state as it had in other world civilizations. In early twentieth-
century Britain, for example, the “activities of the Royal Geographical 
Society” supported “the technics and mechanics of the management of 
Empire.”127 By the end of the Century, “[g]eographers now seek, by and 
large, to contribute to what can best be called ‘the technics and mechanics 
of urban, regional and environmental management.’”128 The latter may 
account for the origin of the concept of the enterprise zone in urban 
planning. 
This Section traces the enterprise zone from concept to tax legislation. 
Harking back to the Enlightenment concept of the state of nature, this 
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zone was a kind of hypothetically free market.129 On islands or oases 
around the world, commerce was to flourish unfettered by tax or other 
laws. Ironically, the delineation of the zone was a legislative act.  
Revisiting the historical and philosophical background, consider the 
following: In England, the classical political economists had referred to 
“a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their 
possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of 
nature.”130 Even then, the rule of law enforced property and contractual 
obligations between private parties.  
The ideology of free trade has been authoritatively commemorated in 
the West.131 Nowadays, economic historians acknowledge a greater 
extent of government support for markets. Starting in the seventeenth 
century, the “creation of global markets for spices, textiles, coffee, tea 
and sugar were the work of monopoly companies like the Dutch and 
English East Indian companies, simultaneously0020engaged in a 
commercial and a naval contest for market shares.”132 The English effort 
was “intimately linked to the expansion of British imperial power.”133 
Then the British Crown supported the “successful creation of the world’s 
largest textile market and cotton-supply chains in the 18th century, which 
made the nationwide adoption of the spinning jenny and factory system 
profitable and inevitable.”134 In the nineteenth century, U.S. tax subsidies 
“drove much of the industrialization of this country, especially the 
creation of the railroad industry.”135 Twentieth-century social scientists 
depicted economic development as a “take-off” that they could 
engineer.136 Since inception, the free market was an artifact of the social 
contract. 
Who pays for the free market? Today, economists observe that the 
“‘free’ market is not free. It is a fundamental public good that is extremely 
costly to create.”137 This is particularly relevant to the current 
industrialization in China. Organized as the People’s Republic in 1949, 
China is now the most populous country with 1.38 billion people in 9.6 
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million square kilometers.138 Per capita, China’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) is $16,700.139 Of GDP, 21.3 percent is captured by tax or other 
revenue.140 This is the powerhouse of the ongoing trans-Pacific industrial 
revolution, supported by the “mercantilist” stance of the PRC.141 The 
affirmative creation of the free market may have become a cosmopolitan 
understanding. If so, the legislation of the enterprise zone forms a logical 
outgrowth. 
Just as the state of nature may never have existed, the free market was 
a hypothetical condition. By the twenty-first century, American social 
scientists could observe that capitalism “has lost its capitalists: too much 
investment is tied up in ‘gray capital,’ controlled by institutional 
managers who seek safe returns for retirees.”142 This would pose the 
entrepreneurial question as under the tax zone incentives: whether 
corporate investment is the appropriate target. 
Inspired by British urban planning, the American tax bills began with 
relief of economic distress. On one hand, the bills may have contributed 
to redistributive welfare; on the other hand, their intention was to unleash 
free enterprise. Over several iterations, the Federal legislation layered 
incentives to conduct business in distressed areas. In turn, these extended 
to zones struck by terrorism or natural disaster as well as market failure. 
While the tax relief may have increased employment, it likewise may 
have raised rent or the cost of living.143 Through numerous economic 
studies cited below, the net effect on impoverished residents has been 
modest at best. Nevertheless, the popularity of tax zones has not 
diminished among legislators. In part, this may be due to the enduring 
conceptual attraction to the state of nature.  
A.  Enterprise Zone 
The predecessor of OZ was a brainchild of urban planners.144 
Geographically, “it was Hong Kong’s example,” which “gave birth to the 
enterprise zone,” or, in other words, a “tax- and regulation-free 
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commercial zone.”145 If these Southeast Asian islands were a kind of 
natural experiment in the free-market economy, urban planners modeled 
the zone as an area for “all kinds of initiative, with minimal governmental 
interference or control.”146 Since the initial suggestion in the British 
urban planning literature a few decades ago, various kinds of zones have 
been promulgated in Europe and America, including the Netherlands and 
the United States.147 A brief comparative profile of the several countries 
just mentioned will be instructive. 
Hong Kong is an island of 1,108 square kilometers.148 Hong Kong 
became part of the Qin Empire in the third century BCE, before 
occupation by the United Kingdom from 1842 to 1997.149 Now, the 
Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, Hong 
Kong has a population of 7.2 million, a per capita GDP of $61,400, and 
revenue of 23 percent of GDP.150 
By the fourteenth century, a Malay trading port existed on the 719 
square kilometers of Singapore.151 In 1819, the United Kingdom 
occupied Singapore, which joined the Malaysian Federation in 1963 but 
became independent in 1965.152 Now the population of 5.9 million enjoys 
a per capita GDP of $94,100.153 Revenue amounts to 15.7 percent of 
GDP.154 
In 1707, the United Kingdom incorporated England and Wales with 
Scotland.155 The British Isles now occupy more than 243 thousand square 
kilometers with a population of 65.6 million people.156 The per capita 
GDP is $44,300 while revenue is 39.1 percent of GDP.157 
In 1579, the Union of Dutch Provinces declared independence from 
the Hapsburg monarchy in Spain.158 In 1815, the Dutch formed the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands.159 After the 1830 secession of the Kingdom 
 
 145. Callies & Tamashiro, supra note 144, at 233 
 146. Peter Hall, Enterprise Zones: British Origins, American Adaptations, 7 BUILT ENV’T 5, 
6 (1981). 
 147. See Jeffrey M. Euston, Clinton’s Empowerment Zones: Hope for the Cities or a Failing 
Enterprise, 3 KANS. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 140, 141 (1994). 
 148. See World Factbook, supra note 138, at Hong Kong. 
 149. Yi-Zheng Lian, Is Hong Kong Really Part of China?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), 
nytimes.com/2018/01/01/opinion/hong-kong-china.html [https://perma.cc/4EY6-8MET].  
 150. World Factbook, supra note 138, at Hong Kong. 
 151. World Factbook, supra note 138, at Singapore. 
 152. Id.; see also CHURCHILL, supra note 85, at 277. 
 153. World Factbook, supra note 138, at Hong Kong. 
 154. Id. 
 155. CHURCHILL, supra note 85, at 54. 
 156. World Factbook, supra note 138, at United Kingdom. 
 157. See id. 
 158. See John Lothrop Motley, 3 RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC: A HISTORY 411 (N.Y., 
Harper & Bros. Publishers 1856). 
 159. World Factbook, supra note 138, at Netherlands. 
398 UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 31 
 
of Belgium, Holland occupies 41.5 thousand square kilometers and is 
home to 17.2 million people.160 The per capita GDP is $53,900 while 
revenue takes up 43.4 percent of GDP.161 
In 1776, the thirteen North American colonies declared independence 
from the United Kingdom.162 The United States expanded westward to 
encompass fifty states and over 9.8 million square kilometers by 1959.163 
As the third-largest country, the U.S. population is 335 million.164 The 
per capita GDP is $62,530 while revenue as a percentage of GDP is only 
17 percent (22 percent including Social Security).165 
To compare these five countries: three are insular or archipelagic; one 
is continental; one is a city-state; two are constitutional monarchies; one 
is a republic; one is a semi-autonomous province of a communist state—
yet four are sovereign nation-states. The five countries are all subject to 
the various effects of physical geography, such as the ecological volatility 
associated with tropical rather than temperate latitude, or the fact that in 
“most countries, people cluster near coasts and navigable rivers.”166 In 
both Hong Kong and Singapore, the marine location for entrepots may 
have been as attractive to commercial transshipment as their regulatory 
status. Despite the heterogenous physical and political geography, all 
these countries impose tax regimes that may be legally comparable.  
For example, in 1996 the Netherlands enacted a special measure for 
metropolitan problems.167 This rule authorized cities to designate 
kansenzones (Opportunity Zones).168 Among other municipal benefits, 
reduction of property tax was a potential incentive.169 At least among the 
countries profiled above, a comparatively high tax burden prevails in 
Holland, making tax reduction attractive there. Across heterogeneous 
jurisdictions, zones of tax relief remain popular.170 In a kind of binary 
opposition, those zones support taxation as an overall structure. 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. See id. 
 162. The Declaration of Independence, 1776, OFF. HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/ 
milestones/1776-1783/declaration [https://perma.cc/9C9Y-9W5H] (last visited Feb. 26, 2020). 
 163. See World Factbook, supra note 138, at United States; Eric Foner & John A. Garraty 
eds. READER’S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY 1025 (Eric Foner & John A. Garraty, eds., 
1991). 
 164. See World Factbook, supra note 138, at United States  
 165. Id. 
 166. Sachs, supra note 8; See Jeffrey D. Sachs, Tropical Underdevelopment 1 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8119, 2001). 
 167. F.A.M. HOBMA & P. JONG, PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT LAW IN THE NETHERLANDS 11 
n.23 (2016). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id.  
 170. For example, the Zones Franches Urbaines incentivize costly relocation. See Thierry 
Mayer et al., The Impact of Urban Enterprise Zones on Establishments’ Location Decisions: 
Evidence from France, 17 CATH. UNIV. LOUVAIN J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 709, 710 (2015). 
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B.  Federal Legislation 
In America, tax incentives have a long history.171 During the 
nineteenth century Industrial Revolution, state tax exemptions were 
“aimed at specific industries and regions, [and] were the ideological 
predecessors of the enterprise zone.”172 Now that industry has waned in 
many places, the zones have had a series of reincarnations. In 1989, a 
survey of state enterprise zones concluded that the states benefited from 
job growth, especially in the inner cities and other areas that otherwise 
would have suffered from low employment.173 Enterprise zones were yet 
to enter federal legislation. 
At the end of the twentieth century, members of Congress introduced 
a series of bills.174 In 1992, economists speculated about “the likely 
effects of some of the proposed federal EZ initiatives” based on “the U.S. 
state and British experiences,” particularly that “limited U.S. survey 
evidence . . . indicates that start-up firms average about 25 percent of 
‘new’ zone businesses.”175 Whatever the uncertainty, President Bill 
Clinton, “in response to the Los Angeles Riots,” the inner city unrest that 
year, “offered a variation of former legislative proposals.”176 Then 
Congress adopted the enterprise zone bill.  
Congress enacted Empowerment Zones within the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA ’93).177 The legislative history 
acknowledged that the “Internal Revenue Code does not contain general 
rules that target specific geographic areas for special Federal income tax 
treatment.”178 Forbearance from targeting comported with uniformity in 
taxation and federal law generally. Constitutionally, “all Duties, Imposts 
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”179 Otherwise, 
pre-existing provisions of tax law favored Puerto Rico and the other 
territorial possessions of the U.S. but arguably reflected their suzerain 
political status as much as their insular locations.180 Expressly geographic 
tax zones were new. 
 
 171. See Kary L. Moss, The Privatizing of Public Wealth, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 101, 106 
(1995). 
 172. Benjamin, supra note 144, at 672-73. 
 173. See RODNEY A. ERICKSON ET AL., PA. ST. UNIV., CTR. FOR REG’L BUS. ANALYSIS, 
ENTERPRISE ZONES: AN EVALUATION OF STATE GOVERNMENT POLICIES 103 (1989). 
 174. See Benjamin, supra note 144 at 661, 674. 
 175. Leslie E. Papke, What Do We Know About Enterprise Zones?, 7 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 
37, 62 (1993). 
 176. Forbes, supra note 143, at 183.  
 177. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 543. 
 178. Legislative History of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, H.R. REP. NO. 
102-1034, at 690 (1993).  
 179. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 180. See Ellen P. Aprill, Caution: Enterprise Zones, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341, 1347 (1993). 
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Nevertheless, the Congress noted that “low-income housing credit 
[LIHTC] and qualified mortgage bond provisions target certain 
economically distressed areas.”181 As of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
(TRA ’86), credit had been allocable by state housing agencies toward 
investors in the cost-basis of the residences of low-income tenants.182 
From 1987–1991, LIHTC was worth $3,246 million as estimated in 
foregone Federal revenue.183 Three decades later, commentators would 
question the efficiency of a tax provision that may have benefited 
landlords as much as tenants.184 
In the same legislation, Congress authorized state and local mortgage 
revenue bonds.185 These bonds would generate tax-free interest, in the 
manner of so-called municipal bonds, where the issuer would lend the 
proceeds to purchasers of homes in low-income Census tracts or other 
economically distressed areas.186 Thus, the previous legislation had 
targeted poor neighborhoods without delineating geographic zones. 
C.  Zone of Empowerment 
The first legislative iteration of a zone of empowerment focused on 
local entrepreneurs. In creating Empowerment Zones or Enterprise 
Communities out of Census tracts that had significant poverty rates, 
Congress stated: “[r]evitalization of economically distressed areas 
through expanded business and employment opportunities, especially for 
residents of those distressed areas, should help alleviate both economic 
and social problems, including distress resulting from narcotics and 
crime.”187 This is because “[i]ncome taxes . . . represent a current cost 
only if the business is profitable.”188 Nevertheless, tax incentives were 
the federal answer to local poverty and unrest. 
 
 181. H.R. REP. NO. 102-1034, at 690 (1993). 
 182. See I.R.C. § 42 (2019). 
 183. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX 
REFORM ACT of 1986 1361 tbl.A-2.II (Comm. Print 1987). 
 184. See Laura Sullivan & Meg Anderson, Affordable Housing Program Costs More, 
Shelters Fewer, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 9, 2017, 12:31 PM), https://www.npr.org/ 
2017/05/09/527046451/affordable-housing-program-costs-more-shelters-less [https://perma.cc/ 
DH8F-9FKU] (stating that “This program has been described as a subterranean ATM, and only 
the developers know the PIN.”); Chris Edwards & Vanessa Brown Calder, Kill the Loopholes, 
Including the One for ‘Low-Income Housing,’ WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18, 2017, 6:47 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/kill-the-loopholes-including-the-one-for-low-income-housing-150 
5774844 [https://perma.cc/M7JL-UGXY]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-784T, 
LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT: ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN OVERSIGHT & 
ACCOUNTABILITY (2017). 
 185. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-1034, at 690 (1993). 
 186. See IRC § 143. 
 187. Legislative History of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, H.R. REP. NO. 
103-111, at 791 (1993). 
 188. Aprill, supra note 180, at 1356. 
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The Empowerment Zones were located around the country. Initially, 
the urban zones included: Atlanta, Georgia; Baltimore, Maryland; 
Chicago, Illinois; Detroit, Michigan; New York, New York; 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Camden, New Jersey.189 Then the rural 
zones included: Kentucky Highlands, Kentucky; Mid-Delta, Michigan; 
and Rio Grande Valley, Texas.190 These were the sites of quantified 
poverty. 
One question was how to keep the economic benefits in these Zones. 
OBRA ’93 contained an “anti-churning” clause.191 This clause concerned 
the state governor who applied to the Secretary of Housing & Urban 
Development (HUD) or of Agriculture for an urban or rural designation, 
respectively.192 The governor was to propose a strategic plan that inter 
alia would refrain from assistance with relocation except in the case of a 
new branch of a business that essentially would not compete against 
existing employers.193 Notwithstanding this requirement of the state plan, 
it remained unclear whether the legislation authorized the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) to deny a tax claim from a relocated business. 
With respect to the taxpayer, the effect of the state plan may have been 
merely precatory. Moreover, the original concept of enterprise zones was 
to attract commerce to otherwise unattractive locales.194  
In the Empowerment Zones, businesses enjoyed tax reductions. 
Employers received a 20-percent credit on up to $15,000 of the wages 
paid to each employee in the Zone.195 Business owners received a 
$35,000 increase to the allowance for immediate expensing which 
covered otherwise depreciable assets.196 Private business activity could 
benefit from tax-exempt financing through state or municipally issued 
exempt facility bonds.197 From 1994 to 1998, the value of these benefits 
was $2.492 billion.198 In sum, the incentives were to employ and invest 
in infrastructure.  
 
 189. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV’T, INTERIM ASSESSMENT OF THE EZ/EC PROGRAM: A 
PROGRESS REPORT 1 n.2 (2001). 
 190. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 111TH CONG., INCENTIVES FOR DISTRESSED 
COMMUNITIES: EMPOWERMENT ZONES & RENEWAL COMMUNITIES 3 n.10 (2009). 
 191. See Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Empowerment Zones & Enterprise Communities Under 
OBRA ’93: A Promising Concept with some Modifications, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 345, 349 (1995). 
 192. See I.R.C. § 1391(e). 
 193. See I.R.C. § 1391(f)(2)(F). 
 194. See Audrey McFarlane, Empowerment Zones: Urban Revitalization Through 
Collaborative Enterprise, 5 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV’T L. 35, 36 (1995). 
 195. See I.R.C. § 1396. 
 196. See I.R.C. § 1397A. 
 197. See I.R.C. § 1394. 
 198. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 103D CONG., SUMMARY OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF 
OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1993 39 app. A.II.G (Comm. Print 1993). 
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In particular, the employer credit was the job incentive. Rather than 
offering jobs or income directly to the employees, the legislation credited 
the job creator. This mechanism ensured that the federal subsidy 
supported the “deserving poor” who worked.199 Harking back to the 
Enlightenment theory, the provision favored labor as the source of added 
value.200 Despite the significant cost in foregone federal revenue, it 
remained unclear whether the various provisions would be enough to 
create a free market oasis. 
Additionally, the legislation offered direct grants. In particular, 
OBRA ’93 authorized social service block grants administered by the 
States.201 Nevertheless, critics on both ends of the spectrum faulted the 
legislation where the distressed zones still needed capital.202 Tax relief 
and even social service may have been an inapposite response to those 
who lacked money.203 
In 1997, urban planners evaluated certain state and federal provisions. 
They wrote that neither “tax incentives, nor nontax incentives, nor 
enterprise zone incentives operate to offset the effects of basic state-local 
tax systems. The locations that offer the highest returns without 
incentives are pretty much the locations with the highest returns after 
incentives are included.” 204 Evidently, this reported ineffectiveness did 
not deter legislation that year. 
In the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TpRA ’97), Congress extended 
similar incentives.205 These covered impoverished Census tracts in the 
District of Columbia, to be known as the D.C. Enterprise Zone 
(DCEZ).206 There the provisions included the following: Employers 
received the 20-percent wage credit.207 Business owners received the 
$35,000 increase to the allowance for immediate expensing.208 Private 
business activity could benefit from certain tax-exempt bonds issued by 
 
 199. See Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit & the Limitations of Tax-Based 
Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 538 n.13 (1995). 
 200. See LOCKE, supra note 62, at ch. V § 27. ADAM SMITH, 1 AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE 
& CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 5 (Edwin Cannan, ed., Methuen & Co. 1904) (1776); 
FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE PART PLAYED BY LABOUR IN THE TRANSITION FROM APE TO MAN 7 (1876). 
 201. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397–1397n-13. 
 202. See Euston, supra note 147, at 146–48. 
 203. See generally JAMES FERGUSON, GIVE A MAN A FISH: REFLECTIONS ON THE NEW 
POLITICS OF DISTRIBUTION (2015). 
 204. Peter S. Fisher & Alan H. Peters, Tax & Spending Incentives & Enterprise Zones, NEW 
ENGLAND ECON. REV. 109, 128 (1997). 
 205. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788.  
 206. See I.R.C. § 1400 (2010) (repealed 2018). 
 207. See I.R.C. § 1400(d) (2010) (repealed 2018). 
 208. See I.R.C. § 1400(a)(2) (2010) (repealed 2018). 
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D.C.209 These provisions were worth $582 million in foregone federal 
revenue.210 
Additionally, capital gain became tax-free. Technically, a 0-percent 
rate applied to gain on the sale of qualified DCEZ business assets held 
for more than five years.211 This provision was worth $502 million in 
foregone federal revenue.212 In short, the incentives were to invest, 
expand, and sell an enterprise. 
For individuals, the provisions included the following: A moderate-
income taxpayer purchasing his or her first home in D.C. could receive 
up to $5,000 in tax credit.213 The latter provision assumed that the 
homebuyer generated enough income tax to use the credit. While the 
former provisions were to benefit business, this credit could attract 
middle-class homeowners. This provision was worth $74 million in 
foregone federal revenue.214 
Moreover, TpRA ’97 created a tax-credit bond. The qualified zone 
academy bond (QZAB) was an alternative to tax-exempt bonds.215 The 
legislation allowed to the QZAB holder a credit, rather than an exclusion 
of interest, at a rate permitting issuance without discount or interest 
cost.216 Given a ten percent private business contribution, state and local 
governments could incur interest-free debt to support elementary or high 
schools.217 In effect, the Treasury paid the bondholders by reducing the 
federal liability that they otherwise had accrued. The legislation allocated 
$400 million annually for a decade as the face amount of QZABs to be 
issued by the states in proportion to their impoverished populations.218 
The credit mechanism corresponded dollar-for-dollar to the bondholder’s 
investment return. Yet tax-credit bonds retained the inefficiency of tax-
exempt bonds by subsidizing wealthy investors as well as pupils in the 
needy zone.219  
Ironically, the ineffectiveness of the original Empowerment Zone 
legislation was confirmed. The Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 
2000 (CRTRA ’00) extended the provisions in Zones that remained 
economically distressed.220 The available tax incentives were similar to 
 
 209. See I.R.C. § 1400A (2010) (repealed 2018). 
 210. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 105TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX 
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN 1997 519 (Comm. Print 1997). 
 211. See I.R.C. § 1400B (2010) (repealed 2018). 
 212. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, supra note 210, at 519. 
 213. See I.R.C. § 1400C (repealed 2018). 
 214. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, supra note 210, at 519. 
 215. See I.R.C. § 1397E (2016) (repealed 2017). 
 216. See I.R.C. § 1397E(a) (2016) (repealed 2017). 
 217. See I.R.C. § 1397E(d) (2016) (repealed 2017). 
 218. See I.R.C. § 1397E(e) (2016) (repealed 2017). 
 219. See DANIEL L. SIMMONS ET AL., FED. INCOME TAX’N 269 (7th ed. 2017). 
 220. See Consolidated Appropriations—FY 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763. 
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those in the original legislation. Employers received the wage credit in 
the amount of fifteen percent.221 Business owners received the $35,000 
increase to the allowance for immediate expensing.222 The zero percent 
rate applied to gain on the sale of qualified business assets held for more 
than five years.223 Additionally, CRTRA ’00 created an incentive for 
building in the commercial revitalization zone by allowing either a 
deduction of half the expenses or a ten year amortization.224 Toward this 
end, the legislation allocated $12 million per state annually for 8 years.225  
Innovatively, CRTRA ’00 enacted the New Markets Tax Credit 
(NMTC).226 This provision was essentially an incentive to invest in low-
income Census tracts.227 In foregone federal revenue, the estimated cost 
was $4.391 billion over a decade.228 
In 2001, the Department of Housing & Urban Development (HUD) 
reported on the Empowerment Zones.229 Job growth occurred, while the 
number of resident- and minority-owned businesses increased 
substantially.230 In the late 1990s, business boomed across the country, 
but it was unclear if the tax incentives were the cause. Of the businesses 
in the Zones, only eleven percent reported using the employment credits, 
four percent reported using the expensing provision, and three percent 
reported using Work Opportunity Tax Credits (WOTC), while sixty-five 
percent of all the businesses reported no benefits of location in the 
Zone.231 The report did “not reach definitive conclusions.”232 
At this point, Congress had enacted a couple of iterations of tax zone 
legislation that recognized zones of poverty by attempting to attract 
investors. The provisions were a novel use of taxation to effectuate 
redistribution, a recurring theme throughout world history. At the same 
time, the legislation neither pulled the residents out of the impoverished 
zone nor granted them seed capital.233  
 
 221. See I.R.C. § 1400H (repealed 2018). 
 222. See I.R.C. § 1400J (repealed 2018). 
 223. See I.R.C. § 1400F (repealed 2018). 
 224. See I.R.C. § 1400I (repealed 2018). 
 225. See I.R.C. § 1400I(d) (repealed 2018). 
 226. See I.R.C. § 45D. 
 227. See I.R.C. § 45D(e). 
 228. STAFF OF J. COMM. TAX’N, 107TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION 
ENACTED IN THE 106TH CONG. 188 app. at 188, JCS-2-01 (Comm. Print 2001). 
 229. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/RCED-98-203, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: 
INFORMATION ON THE USE OF EMPOWERMENT ZONE AND ENTERPRISE COMMUNITY TAX INCENTIVES 
(1998). 
 230. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV’T, supra note 189, at ii. 
 231. Id. at iii. 
 232. Id. at Foreword. 
 233. See BRUCE K. MULOCK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS20381, EMPOWERMENT 
ZONE/ENTERPRISE COMMUNITIES PROGRAM: OVERVIEW OF ROUNDS I, II & III (2002). 
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D.  Zones of Crisis 
Then the Congress was overtaken by geopolitical events. The Job 
Creation & Worker Assistance Act of 2002 (JC&WAA ’02) created the 
New York Liberty Zone—not to remedy endemic poverty—but to help 
rebuild after the terrorist hijacking that destroyed the World Trade Center 
on September 11, 2001.234 At the same time, this tax bill delineated a 
geographic zone. 
In New York City, the legislation enhanced several pre-existing 
provisions by: increasing WOTC (i.e. the credit to employers for wages 
paid);235 allowing thirty percent additional depreciation;236 accelerating 
depreciation recovery periods especially for commercial leaseholds;237 
allocating $8 billion toward realty bonds;238 expanding the availability of 
advance refunding bonds;239 widening the scope of the immediate 
expense deduction;240 and extending from two to five years the period for 
deferral of gain on involuntary conversion.241 The estimated cost of the 
New York Liberty Zone was $5.029 billion in federal revenue to be 
foregone over a decade.242 These provisions reflected a private-public 
partnership to rebuild commercial real estate. 
Despite sympathy for the victims, critics faulted the legislation. Legal 
scholars commented that “it would be difficult to find five square miles 
on earth less in need of enhanced development incentives than the 
southern tip of Manhattan, which has a credible claim to being the 
business and financial capital of the planet.”243 This observation echoes 
the inefficiency concern with previous provisions, such as LIHTC or tax-
advantaged bonds, which benefited the investors as well as the low-
income beneficiaries.  
 
 234. Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, 116 Stat. 21. 
This followed the Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–134, which 
offered tax reduction to affected individuals without delineating a geographic zone for purposes 
of this Article. 
 235. See I.R.C. § 1400L(a) (repealed 2018). 
 236. See I.R.C. § 1400L(b) (repealed 2018). 
 237. See I.R.C. § 1400L(c) (repealed 2018). 
 238. See I.R.C. § 1400L(d) (repealed 2018). 
 239. See I.R.C. § 1400L(e) (repealed 2018). 
 240. See I.R.C. § 1400L(f) (repealed 2018). 
 241. See I.R.C. § 1400L(g) (repealed 2018). 
 242. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 107TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX 
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 107TH CONG. 326 app. (2003). 
 243. Ellen P. Aprill & Richard Schmalbeck, Post-Disaster Tax Legislation: A Series of 
Unfortunate Events, 56 DUKE L.J. 51, 77 (2006). 
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Thereafter, empirical research on the effect of various tax zone 
programs reflected incomplete results.244 In 2003, economists reported 
that state incentives “tend to increase the rate of business failures in the 
target areas, offsetting their positive impact in attracting new businesses 
in the target areas and favoring the growth of EZ businesses that remain 
on the market.”245 This was the paradoxical result of a policy premised at 
least in part on displacement. 
In 2004, scholars conducted research in various states. The state 
‘‘[z]ones did lead to new business activity inside the zones. The number 
of births [of new businesses] and employment, payroll, and shipments 
due to those births all increased significantly in the zones post-
designation.’’246 The incidence of new business was consistent with prior 
evaluation. In California, ‘‘the enterprise zone designation raises 
employment growth about three percent each year during the first six 
years after the designation,” although “this effect does not persist in later 
years. The number of employees at each business in an enterprise zone 
also rises more than employment at businesses that do not have the same 
tax incentives.’’247 At least according to these studies of local programs, 
the net effect was positive. 
Another external event ushered in the next major bill. In the wake of 
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 
2005 (GOZA ’05) turned the parishes and counties designated by the 
federal disaster declaration—some of which were already 
impoverished—into a tax haven of sorts.248  
After the legislation of the New York Liberty Zone, GOZA ’05 poses 
the question whether tax relief should be the response to disaster. 
Historically, taxation has been redistributive. Metaphorically, the 
contributions of highland compatriots could balance those of flooded 
lowlanders. As civilizations progress, “a richer and more technologically 
advanced society can prevent natural hazards from becoming human 
catastrophes.”249 Here, aid to devastated areas by the federal government 
may be viewed as an implicit form of insurance—the country as a whole 
 
 244. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-03-1102, TAX ADMINISTRATION: 
INFORMATION IS NOT AVAILABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER $5 BILLION IN LIBERTY ZONE TAX 
BENEFITS WILL BE REALIZED 2 (2003). 
 245. Daniele Bondonio, Do Tax Incentives Affect Local Economic Growth? What Mean 
Impacts Miss in the Analysis of Enterprise Zone Policies, CTR. ECON. STUD., Sept. 2003, at 5. 
 246. Robert Greenbaum & John B. Engberg, The Impact of State Enterprise Zones on Urban 
Manufacturing Establishments, 23 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 315 (2004). 
 247. Suzanne O’Keefe, Job Creation in California’s Enterprise Zones: A Comparison Using 
a Propensity Score Matching Model, 55 J. URB. ECON. 131 (2004). 
 248. See Gulf Zone Opportunity Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-135, 119 Stat. 2577. This 
added to and codified provisions similar to those in the Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-73. 
 249. PINKER, supra note 124, at 187. 
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acts to spread the risk of the cost of natural disasters. Specifically, “the 
income tax system provides a certain level of implicit insurance which 
emanates from provisions which allow for deduction of losses and, in 
some instances, deduction of insurance payments, as well as the exclusion 
of recoveries from insurance companies or the tortfeasors themselves.”250 
Inherently, federal government spreads risk across the country, yet this 
begs the question of taxation. Preference for the disaster zone may convey 
congressional sympathy for the victim but “distorts tax policy, by, for 
example, favoring the temporarily afflicted wealthy over the permanently 
poor.”251 As in the Empowerment Zone where enhancements such as 
those to depreciation were a bonus inaccessible to the poor, tax relief 
could be little comfort to a displaced tenant. Nonetheless, GOZA ’05 
offered numerous provisions. 
Incentives to rebuild after the Gulf Coast hurricanes supplemented a 
score of pre-existing provisions. These included: allowing a credit 
relative to the wages paid to an employee retained in the GO Zone;252 
enhancing depreciation;253 allocating toward tax-exempt and tax-credit 
bonds;254 expanding the availability of advance refunding bonds;255 and 
widening the scope for immediate deduction of demolition expenses.256 
GOZA ’05 enhanced, within the disaster zone, the LIHTC and NMTC 
enacted in TRA ’86 and CRTRA ’00 respectively.257 As in the 
Empowerment Zones, the employment incentive was deployed in the GO 
Zone. As in the New York Liberty Zone, public-private infrastructure 
incentives applied in the GO Zone. 
GOZA ’05 reflected the ecological nature of the disaster. 
Consequently, businesses in the GO Zone benefited from increased 
deductibility of: disaster loss of utilities;258 net operating loss (NOL) on 
timberland;259 reforestation expenses;260 and environmental remediation 
cost.261 Builders who restored historic structures received an enhanced 
rehabilitation credit in the GO Zone.262 Employers who offered housing 
to displaced employees received a credit for the cost, which became an 
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excludable benefit.263 Employers could take an extended period to amend 
their retirement plans to facilitate loans and other withdrawals by 
hurricane victims.264 The victim-employees received relief from the ten 
percent additional tax on early distributions and expanded ability to 
recontribute withdrawals applied to the purchase of a home.265 
Residential as well as commercial real estate was the object in the GO 
Zone. In foregone federal revenue, the estimated cost of GOZA ’05 was 
$8.668 billion over a decade.266 
GOZA ’05 was unlike the previous legislation that focused almost 
exclusively on business. Instead, the hurricane legislation responded to 
the human tragedy with a number of provisions for individuals, especially 
low-income taxpayers. GOZA ’05 effectively increased the refundable 
earned income (EITC) and additional child tax credits (ACTC), in part 
by allowing otherwise excludable combat pay of soldiers to increase 
earned income.267 Both the EITC and ACTC supplement the wages of 
low-income workers, so these provisions are qualitatively distinct from 
most of the provisions that were for business. Of the overall cost of 
GOZA ’05, $28 million was for the EITC and ACTC enhancements, 
while another $14 million was attributable to the combat pay provision.268 
These refundable credits were the direct measures of poverty alleviation 
within the almost $9 billion bill.  
Additionally, the Hope Scholarship and lifetime learning credits 
increased for disaster victims.269 Of the overall cost of GOZA ’05, $55 
million was attributable to the education credits.270  
Under GOZA ’05, the deductibility of personal losses and charitable 
contributions increased.271 In the case of corporate donations, they had to 
be for hurricane relief to qualify for the increased deduction limit.272 Of 
the overall cost of the bill, $1.174 billion was for the expansion of 
personal losses, while $91 million was for charitable deductions.273 
Procedurally, the legislation confirmed the extension of tax filing and 
payment deadlines in the zone.274 Although GOZA ’05 did not target 
 
 263. See I.R.C. § 1400P (repealed 2018). 
 264. See I.R.C. § 1400Q(d) (repealed 2018). 
 265. See I.R.C. § 1400Q(a), (b) (repealed 2018). 
 266. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 109TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX 
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 109TH CONG. 792 app. (Comm. Print 2007) [hereinafter JCT STAFF 
2007]. 
 267. See I.R.C. § 1400S(d) (repealed 2018); I.R.C. § 32(c)(2)(B)(vi). 
 268. JCT STAFF 2007, supra note 266. 
 269. See I.R.C. § 1400O (repealed 2018). 
 270. JCT STAFF 2007, supra note 266. 
 271. See I.R.C. § 1400S(a), (b) (repealed 2018). 
 272. See I.R.C. § 1400S(a)(4)(A)(ii) (repealed 2018). 
 273. JCT STAFF 2007, supra note 266. 
 274. See I.R.C. § 1400S(c) (repealed 2018).  
2021] FISCAL GEOGRAPHY 409 
 
zones by poverty rate, it effectively delineated a geographic area for 
economic assistance.275 
Meanwhile, researchers continued to measure the effect of prior 
legislation. In 2006, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
reported that “improvements in poverty, unemployment, and economic 
growth had occurred,” although the analysis “could not tie these changes 
definitively to the [empowerment zone (EZ)] designation.”276 At the same 
time, independent research on the empowerment zones in Baltimore, 
Chicago, Detroit, and New York, which were otherwise undergoing an 
urban renaissance of sorts, found that “zone initiatives had little 
impact.’’277 Thus, the results continued to be ambiguous. 
Then regional studies captured countervailing effects within local 
zones. State ‘‘EZ property values are bid up by businesses seeking to 
expand or locate operations in the EZs” effectively reducing “amounts 
that these businesses would otherwise spend on capital assets or 
labor.’’278 At least in the case of these state programs, the paradox of 
displacement may have persisted. 
Likewise, further study revealed offsetting effects. In 2008, 
economists found evidence in the empowerment zones of decrease in 
unemployment and poverty by a few percentage points, accompanied by 
an increase in the value of housing.279 Similarly, a 2009 study of the 
Empowerment Zones confirmed “a sizeable and significant positive 
effect on home values.”280 Subsequent research would confirm that Texas 
“EZ designation is associated with increases in home values.’’281 
Increased housing value may relate to an increase in rent, which in turn 
could disadvantage tenants, raising the question of the net effect of zone 
incentives.282  
 
 275.  See I.R.C. § 1400N(i)(1) (repealed 2018). 
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443, 443 (2006). 
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 279. See Matias Busso & Patrick Kline, Do Local Economic Development Programs Work? 
Evidence from the Federal Empowerment Zone Program 21 (Yale Univ. Econ. Dep’t, Working 
Paper No. 36, 2008). 
 280. Douglas J. Krupka & Douglas S. Noonan, Empowerment Zones, Neighborhood Change 
& Owner-Occupied Housing, 39 REG’L SCI. & URB. ECON. 386, 395 (2009). 
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BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Spring 2008, at 155, 201–03. 
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Researchers analyzed the relocation incentive of NMTC. The 
researchers inferred that “corporations have most likely shifted 
investment funds from higher income communities to NMTC-eligible 
communities.’’283 Later, a think-tank would quantify significant ‘‘NMTC 
investments per job generated for early-year projects.”284 While the 
relocation incentive was confirmed, the overall effect may have remained 
in question.285 
E.  Zone of Recovery 
Next, Congress continued to respond to events. In 2008, the housing 
and financial markets crashed in what became known as the Great 
Recession. Then the tax subtitle of the American Recovery & 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA ’09) contained provisions for the 
Recovery Zone (RZ).286 In particular, the legislation expanded the 
portfolio of tax-credit bonds introduced by TpRA ’97.287 The legislation 
allocated $1.4 billion for each of 2009 and 2010 as the face amount of 
QZABs to be issued by the states in proportion to their unemployment 
rates.288 Similarly, ARRA ’09 allocated $10 billion to RZ economic 
development and $15 million to RZ facility tax-credit bonds.289 The Zone 
related to a new incidence of unemployment. 
Despite decades of legislation, the economic effects of the various 
types of zones continued to be indeterminate. In 2010, California 
researchers stated that “the evidence indicates that enterprise zones do 
not increase employment.”290 More cautiously, GAO reported: 
‘‘Although improvements in poverty, unemployment, and economic 
growth had occurred in the EZs and ECs, our econometric analysis of the 
eight urban EZs could not tie these changes definitively to the EZ 
designation.’’291 To the extent that some evidence was positive, other 
evidence was not. 
 
 283. Tami Gurley-Calvez et al., Do Tax Incentives Affect Investment? An Analysis of the New 
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 286. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115. 
 287. H.R. REP. NO. 111-16, at 582 (2009) (Conf. Rep.). 
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ANALYSIS & MGMT. 5, 5 (2010). 
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More recent studies emphasized positive effects. In 2011, economists 
found that state and federal programs had “positive, statistically 
significant impacts on local labor markets in terms of the unemployment 
rate, the poverty rate, the fraction with wage and salary income, and 
employment.’’292 In 2012, a study of the NMTC found “modest” but 
“positive effects of subsidized investment in disadvantaged 
neighborhoods.”293  
In 2013, economists announced that the Federal ‘‘EZ designation 
substantially increased employment in zone neighborhoods and 
generated wage increases for local workers without corresponding 
increases in population or the local cost of living.’’294 Other experts on 
the Empowerment Zone countered: “If the goal of policy makers is to 
induce relocation, it seems that even this modest objective may come at 
a cost of destroying jobs and establishments in areas that compete with 
targeted places.’’295 The offsetting effect persisted.  
In 2014, regional scholars concluded that in the Empowerment Zone, 
‘‘the tax incentives offered by the program notably enhance the quality 
of business environment for firms in the area while modestly improving 
the quality of life for the individuals living in the area.’’296 Decades of 
studies seemed to point to modest effects at best.297  
F.  Land of OZ 
Nevertheless, the current Zone followed the previous versions.298 
TC&JA ’17 repealed the tax-credit and advance refunding bonds while 
carving new OZs out of low-income Census tracts.299 If nominated by the 
Governor and certified by the Treasury Secretary,300 an OZ also may be 
a tract whose median family income does not exceed 125 percent of that 
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of the contiguous low-income community.301 Thus, an OZ need not itself 
be poverty stricken. 
The tax benefits in OZ include the following:302 An exclusion applies 
to gain on an investment in a qualified opportunity fund (QOF), while a 
deferral applies to reinvestment.303 The legislation effectively deems 
basis to increase the longer an investment remains in the QOF.304 In turn, 
the QOF is a corporation or partnership that invests in OZ business.305  
Already, the Treasury has certified zones. There “are roughly 8,700 
opportunity zones throughout the U.S. spanning aging Rust Belt towns, 
low-income areas of major cities and rural swaths of the West.”306 Like 
landscapes everywhere, the North American fiscal geography is an 
artifact of Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions past and present. Over 
a decade, the estimated value of the provisions is $1.6 billion in foregone 
Federal revenue.307 
Less than a year after enactment, a journalist editorialized  as follows: 
“Opportunity Zones weren’t created as a way to achieve specific social 
goals but as a way to lower taxes on real estate ventures and shares of 
stock that are usually held by the rich.”308 This commentary resonates 
with that on LIHTC—the first generation of poverty zone tax 
legislation—now dubiously associated with “slum-lords.”309  
Notwithstanding the lack of empirical confirmation, the presentation 
of business tax cuts as a potential relocation incentive has proven 
irresistible to legislators over the decades. Through the legislation, 
Congress has delineated geographic zones of poverty as the beneficiaries 
of tax redistribution. Economists have observed modest take–up by 
entrepreneurs.  
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G.  Summary 
Inescapably, federal taxation is geographically redistributive. Where 
a place is economically determinative, federal taxation also may 
redistribute economically. Paradoxically, the free-market potential may 
have spurred the proliferation of the legislative intervention in the poverty 
zone. The welfare state grew to accommodate commercial investors. As 
codified, taxation is incorporated into the rule of law. Yet questions of 
equity and efficiency persist. The tax zone legislation deliberately 
disrupts the horizontal equity between similarly situated taxpayers, 
incentivizing relocation. The question is whether the resulting effect on 
vertical equity was worth it. Geographically, the legislation targeted 
distressed areas but not necessarily the low–income residents. Beyond 
some incentives to earn income, most of the benefits accrued to outside 
investors, whose businesses could have the effect of raising rent and the 
cost of living for poor locals. If this was not the intended result, the 
legislation was inefficient in allocating benefits.  
This is not to mention the complexity and distortion of business 
choices by the tax incentive. As the legislative premise, tax reduction was 
the incentive for the entrepreneur to do business in the zone rather than a 
similarly situated site. Yet exponents of free trade characterize “the 
invisible hand of free markets” as “the force through which individuals 
and businesses put economic resources to their greatest value.”310 In the 
enterprise zone as well as elsewhere in fiscal geography, the “tax 
code . . . gets in the way of free commerce . . . .”311 In sum, the legislative 
creation of a market may not be free. While there is no return to the state 
of nature, the land of OZ may not be the home of rationality. 
IV.  TRAVELERS IN THE LAND OF OZ 
Generally, national tax law operates on the local taxpayer. 
Traditionally, the discipline of public finance assumed a rational actor 
who, as an enlightened individual, optimized the benefit for the cost. In 
the case of the zoned incentives, the tax benefit may have been 
infrequently worth the cost of doing business in the inner city or blighted 
countryside. In the perception of the entrepreneurial taxpayer who was 
the subject of the incentives, the cost of doing business in an inhospitable 
market may have been too high. This Section considers the perspective 
of the taxpayer whose behavior is not merely economic but also 
psychological. The question of the take–up rate of tax incentives becomes 
one of behavioral economics.  
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Once the taxpayer is characterized as a psychological actor, this 
Section extends that characterization to the tax collector. Neither are 
government officials automatons. Instead, they too have a behavioral 
rationale that in their case may be described as bureaucratic praxis. 
Assuming the reality of the welfare state where the roles of taxpayer and 
tax collector are not diametrically opposed, the issue becomes one of 
coordination. In the case of the zones and other taxes, the legislation may 
not neatly fit the needs of the targeted taxpayer. As a practical matter, it 
may fall to the tax collector or other revenue agent to tailor the results. 
The accommodation of local needs within federal law returns to historic 
themes in fiscal geography.  
A.  The Psychological Taxpayer 
If a zone of opportunity offers tax reduction, will people move there? 
While a cost-minimizing rational actor would move, the experience 
detailed above has yielded mixed results. What else drives people? While 
ancient history began with agricultural subsistence, a more nuanced 
analysis may help.312 First, “the meaning of subsistence cannot be 
established independent of particular historical and cultural 
circumstances if . . . definitions of social wants and needs were produced 
under a given mode of production rather than immutably held down by 
the Malthusian laws of population.”313 Where even subsistence is an 
artifact, lower tax may not be enough incentive to move to a bad 
neighborhood.  
Second, people are not rational actors. Especially in industrial society, 
“[e]conomic man himself has given way to the psychological man of our 
times—the final product of bourgeois individualism.”314 Psychology 
raises “a more primitive question as to whether individuals actually do 
behave in the manner postulated, i.e., maximizing the expected 
utility . . . by considering the probabilistic impact . . . .”315 Instead, “the 
individuals are guided . . . by something much simpler, viz., just a desire 
to record one’s true preferences.”316 Individuals in the bourgeois society 
appear to express themselves rather than their calculated best interest. 
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2021] FISCAL GEOGRAPHY 415 
 
In the twenty-first century, commercial consumption has become 
experiential. “Social media have encouraged younger people to show off 
their experiences rather than their cars and wardrobes, and hipsterization 
leads them to distinguish themselves by their tastes in beer, coffee, and 
music.”317 The millennial generation may lead an advance beyond 
acquisitive accumulation. 
At the same time, the marketplace of ideas is flooded. Through the 
mass media, “[t]ruth has given way to credibility, facts to statements that 
sound authoritative without conveying any authoritative information.”318 
According to American historians, “[t]rust in journalism began to weaken 
during the Vietnam War, when reporters dutifully repeated the 
government’s lies about the trajectory of the conflict.”319 Then 
journalistic credibility “rebounded during Watergate, but it never 
returned to its 1950s and 1960s heights, when Walter Cronkite was 
dubbed the most trusted man in America.”320 When even the news may 
be fake, a reader needs to become a consumer advocate. 
The reactions have been defensive. In particular, psychologists 
diagnose “identity-protective cognition, in which people cling to 
whatever opinion enhances the glory of their tribe and their status within 
it.”321 Then it becomes critical which “intuition of ‘tribe’ we are born 
with . . . .”322 Naturally, this instinctive notion “cannot be a nation-state, 
which is a historical artifact of the 1648 Treaties of Westphalia.”323 
Nevertheless, people may seek solace in received social identities 
especially during periods of economic distress and disruption.324 
Defensive reactions may relate to risk aversion. Generally, 
psychological actors “fight harder to prevent losses than to achieve 
gains.”325 Risk aversion may be more motivating than opportunity. 
On the other end of the spectrum, money may not be enough. At 
higher income levels, “there is consumption satiation” when “work is 
done for reasons barely connected with the income it provides to the 
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‘labourer’.”326 Those reasons include “self-regard and achievement” for 
which “money is a proxy” in the case of “the billionaire looking for the 
extra billion.”327 This sentiment is captured in a best-selling journalist’s 
interview of an executive, who explained: “A man wants to get to the top 
of the corporation . . . how much more money can you make? . . .  It’s the 
power, the status, the prestige.”328 A land of opportunity may not attract 
a seeker of prestige locations. 
In the tax incentive zones, decades of economic studies reflected 
modest take-up rates. Evidently, the reduction in tax itself has not been 
enough to induce the significant establishment of business in the inner 
city or blighted countryside. That is, the tax reduction may not outweigh 
the expense or perceived cost of locating in an unattractive area. In this 
equation, the psychological identity of the taxpayer subject to the 
incentive cannot be ignored.  
B.  The Practical Bureaucrat 
To mirror the economic or rather psychological behavior of taxpayers, 
consider the behavior of tax collectors.329 They enforce the rule of law, 
assuming a modern salaried bureaucracy. In the popular imagination, 
enforcement has fueled the “mutually hostile views held by tax collectors 
and taxpayers.”330 In the case of the IRS, the bureaucracy developed as 
follows. 
In the twentieth century, the theory fit the problem. When the U.S. 
taxpayer population expanded exponentially, mass production became an 
inevitable solution to processing the myriad tax returns. Early in this 
century, the leading socio-legal scholar who visited America from 
Germany observed that standardization enabled government offices to 
process a great volume of cases with formal disinterest at the cost of 
substantive discretion, viz “without regard for persons” in a 
“dehumanized” manner.331 At the time, bureaucracy meant efficient 
modernization. 
Mass production expanded under a model of scientific 
management.332 Eponymously, American engineer Frederick Winslow 
Taylor articulated this, describing an operation that “divided skills into a 
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sequence of simple procedures to be taught to workers and monitored by 
management.”333 In 1911, Taylor recommended “accurate records . . . of 
the amount of work done by each man and of his efficiency,” to justify 
adjustments of “each man’s wages” to be “raised as he improves, [while] 
those who fail to rise to a certain standard are discharged . . . .”334 In 1925, 
the Bureau of Internal Revenue established an Efficiency-Record Section 
for personnel functions as well as training of income tax examiners and 
technicians.335 Even today, any particular revenue agent may develop 
efficiency in one skill or program, but few IRS employees (mostly high-
level executives) understand the tax code as a whole. As a result, a 
treasury functionary may not comprehend how a provision affects the 
taxpayer’s circumstances. Then critics complained that Taylorism 
induced a clerk to “‘forget’ or not think about the intellectual content of 
the text he is reproducing.”336 Despite the alienation inherent in Taylor’s 
scientific management, it programmed adherence to the rules. 
By the same token, the expanding inventory of tax returns made 
examination of any one rare. As a practical matter, the tax collectors 
would have to exercise tolerance. The latter turns out to be an 
administrative prescription for accepting at face value a taxpayer’s return 
or claim below a statistical threshold.337 The result is not lawless but 
rather a “gapless” effect.338 Contrary to the crude version of legal realism, 
administrative law depends not merely on what the official “ate for 
breakfast.”339 If their advisors knew what would constitute an acceptable 
return, coordination between the taxpayers and the tax collector 
substantiates the rule of law. 
If the taxpayer and the tax collector effectively coordinate, the tax 
bureaucracy may be a locus where the rule of law is realized. 
Traditionally, social scientists may have focused on courts, but 
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“institutions of justice” refers not only to “institutions specially assigned 
the task of resolving disputes, but rather applies to all institutions 
addressed to provide a remedy.”340 (This is not to mention that “many 
people prefer to bring their grievances to non-state institutions, including 
traditional or religious leaders, trade unions, NGOs,”341 or the like). As 
anthropologists have noted, “[t]ax law tells much about the nature of 
government,” not just about revenue.342 
C.  The Para-Ethnographer 
Just as taxpayers are psychological actors rather than cost-benefit 
calculators, tax collectors are not mere automatons. On one hand, it would 
be “low-minded sentimentalism” to assume “that everyone is constantly 
motivated only by simple self-interest—and nothing else.”343 On the 
other hand, it would be “high-minded sentimentalism” to assume that “all 
human beings (and public servants in particular) try constantly to promote 
some selfless ‘social good.’”344 Instead, tax collectors and other 
bureaucrats have their own behavioral praxis.  
Assuming the rule of law, bureaucrats act in an official, not personal, 
capacity. In particular, tax collectors must “treat all members of their 
community as equals, and the individual’s normal latitude for self-
preference is called corruption in their case.”345 Like other officials who 
make determinations of fact, the tax collector “will develop, in the course 
of his training and experience, a fairly individualized working conception 
of law on which he will rely, perhaps unthinkingly, in making these 
various judgments and decisions, and the judgments will be, for him, a 
matter of feel or instinct rather than analysis.”346 Official judgment, 
subject to administrative oversight by inspectors general as well as 
judicial review by courts, is different from personal preference. As a 
precursor of government oversight, even “the Inca could take any matter 
out of the governor’s hands if he chose.”347 An official judgment must be 
consistent with the position of the government as a whole.  
Nevertheless, human judgment has been deemed necessary whenever 
rules and regulations were not internally consistent. In the United States 
and other industrial economies, the complexity of the revenue code is 
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legendary.348 The bureaucrat’s experience at negotiating bewildering 
complexity vis-à-vis the taxpayer can be ethnographic in nature. This type 
of experience has been captured by the journalist’s now historic interview 
of a social insurance worker, who said, “After I got to OEO [the Office 
of Economic Opportunity] it became more and more obvious to me that 
a lot of these rules were wrong, that rules were not sacrosanct.”349 In some 
cases, the bureaucrat may sympathize with the taxpayer more than with 
the government.  
Anthropologists have captured the self-awareness of the bureaucrat. 
For an informant like the one interviewed, they have coined the term 
“para-ethnography.”350 The latter describes bureaucratic praxis much as 
behavioral economics describes taxpayer psychology.  
When and where the rule of law has codified the concept of economic 
opportunity or social rights, bureaucratic judgment becomes more 
important. If the question is the affirmative obligation of the government 
rather than merely a check on executive power, “the judiciary alone is not 
sufficient to protect citizens, which is a logical result of the rise of the 
welfare state.”351 Consequently, ombudsmen “have been adopted by 
many countries.”352 In the United States, the Social Security 
Administration employs approximately 1,500 administrative law judges 
in 166 hearing offices across the country.353 By comparison, the IRS 
stations a Local Taxpayer Advocate in each of the fifty states.354 These 
quasi-judicial bureaucrats play an intermediary role between the 
government and taxpayers.  
For example, the IRS deploys administrative discretion in various 
ways. In the context of natural disaster, the IRS instructs its operators to 
accept at face value a telephone call asserting that the caller is an 
“affected taxpayer” although not domiciled in the federally declared 
disaster zone.355 Consequently, the caller avails him- or herself of 
extensions of time to file returns and pay taxes.356 In routine tax 
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examinations, receipts or documentation may be required.357 In disaster, 
IRS protocols recognize the exigency of the circumstances. 
More generally, the IRS can waive penalties for failure to timely file 
returns or pay taxes.358 The grounds would be reasonable cause, based on 
ordinary business care and prudence, which the IRS has applied to a range 
of circumstances from illness to ignorance of the law.359 “Death, serious 
illness, or unavoidable absence of the taxpayer, or a death or serious 
illness in the taxpayer’s immediate family, may establish reasonable 
cause for filing, paying, or depositing late[.]”360 Logistically, these facts 
are natural events in human life. In the case of ignorance, the IRS will 
consider the taxpayer’s education as well as the objective facts of the case 
relevant to taxation.361 The latter includes: any previous application of 
the tax to the taxpayer; any previous penalty on the taxpayer; recent 
changes in the tax forms or law which the taxpayer could not reasonably 
be expected to know; and the level of complexity of the tax or compliance 
issue.362 On the other hand, the level of education may characterize an 
individual as a participant in society and not merely as a taxpayer. As 
discussed above, social entitlements, such as those to health, education, 
and welfare, may enable citizens to avail themselves of the rule of law. 
To the extent that the IRS can grant relief in view of personal 
characteristics, the bureaucracy may become more humane if more 
subjective. 
In the twenty-first century, proposals emerged for the IRS role in 
social entitlements. Provisions such as the EITC, first-time home buyer 
credit, and refundable premium tax credit for low-income patients under 
the Affordable Care Act highlighted the tax collector’s role in welfare 
administration.363 Incidentally, the Health Insurance Marketplace 
Exchange may be the grandest federal act of market creation in this 
century.364  
Consequently, commentators proposed that the IRS create a new 
office of Deputy Commissioner for social benefits.365 Although neither 
the Congress nor the Administration acted on the proposal, it underscored 
the extent to which tax expenditures had made the revenue agency an all-
around fiscal facilitator of both collection and disbursement. Change in 
bureaucratic behavior would become inevitable. 
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If the IRS and other government agencies conduct themselves 
according to internal rationales, critics may fear the “Deep State.”366 
Conspiracy theorists demonize “the government’s massive security 
apparatus as conducted by the federal defense and intelligence 
agencies.”367 Other skeptics “see ordinary imperfect human beings and 
ordinary human institutions, acting too often with greed, fear, and with 
messy self-interests.”368 Both view the Deep State as “a vast, self-
perpetuating bureaucracy whose aim is singular: to exist again tomorrow 
and the day after, to replicate itself, to be indestructible and nearly 
impossible to disrupt.”369 It is an important sociological observation that 
organizations, especially governmental entities, exist independently of 
their members.370 Nonetheless, government bureaucracies in particular 
are creatures of law. As exemplified above, reasonable cause is a 
statutory concept. Consequently, lawmakers can regulate the 
bureaucracy. Self-perpetuation of the Deep State should not become the 
legislator’s excuse.  
In the tax incentive zones, Congress intended to encourage commerce. 
Originally, the Empowerment Zones were for local business rather than 
those that relocated. Yet the face of the tax code allowed the relevant 
credits and deductions based on the prescribed criteria. In processing the 
applicable returns, the IRS would not have seen who relocated or not. As 
a mass data processor, the IRS mechanically allowed the claims that met 
the requirements. In microcosm, the tax collector was merely a 
programmed mechanism. Had Congress wished the IRS to apply broader 
criteria, the legislature could have done so. Of course, that could have led 
to differing judgments and potential disputes. As it happened, the tax 
legislation resulted in mechanical application. Whether particular 
enterprises attracted community enthusiasm, the credits and deductions 
fell where they did.  
D.  Summary 
The effect of the zone incentives, like other tax legislation, depends 
on the reaction of the taxpayer. In turn, a taxpayer acts in tandem with a 
revenue agent. Traditionally, the taxpayer and tax collector were 
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conceptualized as an adversarial pair. When a tax provision makes an 
incentive rather than a liability, it becomes easier to see the revenue agent 
as a reflective partner of the taxpayer. This characterization more easily 
extends to other official functionaries in the welfare state. The collectors 
may see themselves as collaborators who navigate the bureaucracy on 
behalf of the taxpaying citizen. Both taxpayers and tax collectors are 
people under economic and legal parameters that condition but do not 
preempt their decision-making. This calls to mind the symbiosis between 
taxpayer and tax collector as described by ancient texts.  
V.  GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION 
Geographic redistribution always has been the effect of national tax 
law. At the same time, economic redistribution has been the practice of 
civilizations that sought to maintain their productive taxpayer population. 
The tax zone provisions fit into this history. However, instead of 
redistributing from rich to poor, much of this legislation seeks to lure 
capital into poor neighborhoods. The results have been modest at best.  
There may be no surprise here. The modest incentive effect of the tax 
reduction offered in the poverty zones may be no surprise to the extent 
that the federal income tax never drove business out in the first place. In 
U.S. history, the so-called urban blight and heartland Rust Belt developed 
in the context of industrial transformation. While the complete economic 
history lies beyond the scope of this Article, an overview of the relevant 
context follows. 
In the mid-twentieth century, the Great Migration occurred.371 This 
led a largely African American population from obsolescent agrarian 
work northward to new manufacturing jobs. Subsequently, the inner city 
became the site of “‘white flight,’ a process by which white households 
left central cities to avoid living in racially diverse neighborhoods or 
jurisdictions.”372 It’s unclear if this flight may have been motivated in 
part by increasing property tax rates which in America are state rather 
than federal imposts.373 Recent econometric research confirms that 
“whites responded to this black influx by leaving cities” where any 
“indirect effect on housing prices” accompanying a migration-induced 
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increase in demand was not the “sole cause” of their departure.374 
Assuming the pre-existing population was not merely rational optimizers, 
it may be no surprise that their geographic decision reflected their 
psychological identity. To the extent that the empirical studies have not 
applied this reasoning to the tax zone legislation, a topic for future 
research persists. 
A case in point is the Rio Grande Valley. Designated an 
Empowerment Zone, the formerly agrarian area remains impoverished.375 
“When agricultural jobs were plentiful along the border, generations of 
people came to South Texas for work.”376 Now, “sectors such as 
agriculture have shrunk.”377 Many colonia communities that remain in 
the “vast, arid region” have “no access to drinkable water.”378 Physical 
geography may be as much to blame for the barren landscape as any 
federal income tax burden. 
As of the late twentieth century, American industry was in decline. 
Geographers observed that the “manufacturing sectors of central cities, 
which have always been more vulnerable to expressions of organized 
discontent or political regulation, have been reduced to zones of . . . high 
unemployment.”379 In particular, “cities like Chicago, New York, Los 
Angeles, and Baltimore have seen their traditional blue-collar 
manufacturing employment cut in half in the last 20 years” of the past 
Century.380 If so, it is no wonder that the first Empowerment Zone 
legislation was a response to the Los Angeles Riots. 
As American industry declined, technology proliferated across the 
Pacific. Specifically, the “rise of China” became “no doubt one of the 
most important events in world economic history since the Industrial 
Revolution.”381 Like the eighteenth and nineteenth century Great 
Transformation in the North Atlantic, the current industrialization in Asia 
would be disruptive on a world-historic scale.382 This is the context in 
which the U.S. landscape changed. 
Similarly, the Rust Belt formed upon the obsolescence of the heavy 
industry that had dotted the American countryside. Geographers noted 
that the “dispersal and creation of many new jobs in rural settings has 
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facilitated capitalist control over labor.”383 Thus, rural and urban facilities 
had been the location not only of agriculture but also “electronics and 
other supposedly ultra-modern industries.”384 Those jobs were 
superseded by world-wide industrialization, especially in Asia. 
Economists confirm the developing “global middle [class], which mostly 
consists of Chinese and Indians, has enjoyed massive growth over the 
past few decades.”385 Social scientists agree “the world’s poor have 
gotten richer in part at the expense of the American lower middle 
class.”386 This is not to mention that “Japan’s lost decade and the collapse 
of the Soviet Union are largely responsible for the slow growth of this 
cohort.”387 Lower middle-class resentment, caused by economic 
displacement, can fester in the East as well as in the West. The Rust Belt 
was a casualty of economic history. 
Federal income taxation would not have been the cause of the 
technological transformation of the world economy. Consequently, it 
may be no surprise that the tax zone incentives have not lured commerce 
back to the mines and industrial plants in the hinterland or inner cities. 
To the extent that the empirical studies have not analyzed the legislation 
in this light, the topic remains open for future research.  
Meanwhile, the geographic intuition of the legislature is undeniable. 
Since the time of the first lawmakers, the legislature has imposed taxation 
not merely to collect the revenue for public functions but effectively to 
redistribute the national wealth. Any flaw in the tax zone concept by 
exception proves the rule of redistributive taxation over the long course 
of economic history. The lesson may be that market creation requires an 
intervention more heroic than narrow tax incentives. 
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the American political 
economy had reached an equilibrium. The post-World War II bipolarity 
had subsided, yet the United States remained a superpower. At that point, 
the reigning consensus between the major electoral parties was such that 
third-party candidates could describe themselves as “Demicans” versus 
“Republocrats.”388 Among other world-historical events, the Sinocentric 
industrial revolution emerged. Lately, the U.S. presidential election 
featured perhaps the most notorious socialist candidate since Eugene 
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Debs as well as a victor associated with white nationalism.389 In the end, 
the electorate had stark ideological choices (both voiced by white, 
patriarchal authority figures).390  
Meanwhile, the Rust Belt and urban blight had become economic 
casualties. Then the disruption would afford political opportunities for 
previously marginalized interests across the spectrum.391 To the extent 
that disruption of entrenched power itself opens opportunity, the future 
had begun.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has described the OZ provision as the latest in a series of 
tax zone incentives enacted over the past few decades. To evaluate the 
effectiveness of these bills, this Article reviewed the relevant economic 
literature. Moreover, the theory underlying the legislation is 
understandable in the context of the historical and philosophical 
foundation in local and national taxation, or fiscal geography. Thus, tax 
zones represent a nexus of law and social science. 
Taxation begins with the taxpayer, wherever he or she lives. There the 
taxpayer produces revenue on the farm, in the shop, or elsewhere. When 
production generates a surplus over subsistence, taxpayers build 
civilizations. These complex states require coordination by law and 
economic distribution throughout the society. Fundamental questions of 
justice arise. 
Historically, solutions followed. The maintenance of the parochial 
population was a natural exigency, and national taxation was 
geographically and economically redistributive. Anthropologists 
observed that the “interlocking of local and national interests has a 
contemporary (one might even say a universal) flavor of competition for 
resources and power.”392 Since geography may determine where there is 
a feast or a famine, the national fiscal function could equalize life 
chances.  
Currently, the tax incentive zones reflect the long-standing 
propositions. Where a population forms a pocket of poverty, lawmakers 
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may be inclined toward relief of economic distress. Federal tax legislation 
may be a suitable vehicle for geographic redistribution. At the same time, 
the legislators may wish to create markets for commercial production. 
Thus, the Empowerment Zones were supposed to incentivize local 
entrepreneurs. Responding to acts in the nature of war and disaster, the 
Liberty and GO Zones were for reconstruction in rich and poor cities, 
respectively. In the Great Recession, the Recovery Zone was for areas of 
unemployment. Now the OZ is for equity investment in poverty zones. 
Over decades of experience, the economic effect of the various tax 
incentives has proven modest at best. 
The effect of the tax incentive zones fits into a larger analytic context. 
At a microeconomic level, incentives apply to rational actors. Yet the 
taxpayer to whom the zone offered the incentive may have behaved 
psychologically rather than rationally. Among the psychological factors 
would have been the perception of the inner city or “blighted” 
countryside. At this point, the role of the tax collector was to allow the 
applicable credits or deductions mechanically. It remained with Congress 
to authorize proactive welfare or business administration.  
As a matter of fiscal geography, taxation is not merely the 
measurement of the codified ability to pay. The preparation of returns and 
collection of revenue are the government’s center of gravity. The 
counterposed behavior of taxpayers and officials is an essential encounter 
in the state’s expansion or contraction. Taxation needs to balance 
between psychological and cultural as well as economic and legal norms.  
At a macroeconomic level, global transformation has occurred. By the 
twenty-first century, American industrial growth was on the decline 
relative to that in China. Although focused federal income tax reduction 
could shift some economic distress among the 50 states, the zone 
provisions may be no match for world-historic forces. In the ongoing 
trans-Pacific industrial revolution, socioeconomic disruption is certain. 
The question remains which measures the countries may adopt to ensure 
the life chances of their inhabitants. 
